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If we would discover the little backstairs door that for any age serves as the secret 
entranceway to knowledge, we will do well to look for certain unobtrusive words with 
uncertain meanings that are permitted to slip off the tongue or the pen without fear and 
without research; words which, having from constant repetition lost their metaphorical 
significance, are unconsciously mistaken for objective realities. In the thirteenth century 
the key words would no doubt be God, sin, grace, salvation, heaven, and the like; in the 
nineteenth century, matter, fact, matter-of-fact, evolution, progress ... 
-Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, 1932 
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Abstract 
This thesis explores the function and politics of various narratives of technoculture. 
In particular, the focus is on how these narratives help articulate and sustain various 
figurations of technologically-implicated identity. The most important of these is Man; a 
hybrid figure made up of the legacy of the modernist project, the Enlightenment, and 
evolutionary narratives, and who has an interest in sustaining his dominion over the 
Other. This work traces the recuperation of these conservative narratives in the 
technocultural realm, a realm characterised by both desires and fears towards 
machines. While logocentrism describes the philosophical guarantee on which many of 
these narratives and figurations rely, this logocentrist system is challenged by new 
technological artefacts and practices. This causes the feminist historian of science 
Donna Haraway to suggest hopefully: 'Perhaps we can learn from the fusions with 
animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of western logos'. 1 
Like the trope of the cyborg, science fiction is a boundary-crossing genre with its 
intermingling of traditionally distinct generic categories: science and fiction. It provides, 
in this way, a particularly rich source of anxious and desiring narratives about 
technologically-mediated change which I will use as my primary lens into this 
technocultural realm. 
Most of the texts I examine do not provide rich new cyborg figurations, or ones 
which have learnt to be other than Man. On the contrary, they are good at recuperating 
conservative metanarratives about humanist individuality, agency, the relationship to 
Otherness, the relationship of the mind to the body, to name just a few. Many 
technocultural texts such as Gattaca, Metropolis and Blade Runner problematise 
technologically-mediated change as a movement toward disorder, before resolving this 
crisis in a corresponding movement towards order in the services of recuperating 
logocentric taxonomies. 
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However, the extreme rewriting of all orders, locations and of the body, does not 
offer a promising solution, as both William Gibson's Neuromancer and Samuel Delany's 
Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand. 
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Introduction 
And instead they watch the machines multiply that push them little by little beyond the 
limits of their nature. And they are sent back to their mountain tops, while the machines 
progressively populate the earth. Soon engendering man as their epiphenomenon. 
-Luce lrigaray. Marine Lover 
The word, "technology" instantly evokes an overwhelming number of competing 
ideologies, fears, desires, and histories. It is an understatement to say the word is loaded; 
rather, technology is so intertwined with social and cultural practices and so pervasive in its 
representations and functions that some critics refer to the cultural subconscious of the late 
twentieth century as being built on a technological imaginary. As Teresa de Lauretis 
comments in 'Signs of Wo/ander': 
Technology is now, not only in a distant science fictional future, an extension of our 
sensory capacities; it shapes our perception and cognitive processes, mediates our 
relationship with objects of the material and physical world, and our relationships with 
our own or other bodies. Technology is inseparable from labor, abstract knowledge, art, 
daily activities, and fantasy .... Technology is our historical context, political and 
personal2. 
This imaginary is based on deep institutional and ideological watersheds in which 
technologies are intrinsic factors. The polemics of these social and cultural frameworks 
contextualise our numerous daily interactions with technologies. If we consider the space age, 
the machine or information age, the age of late-capitalism, of consumerism and mass-
communication, of apocalyptic second millenarianism; the age of smart bombs and weapons 
of mass destruction, of bioethical crises such as are inherent in the Human Genome Project 
or the cloning of Dolly the sheep, the age of freedom movements such as feminism and 
antiracism, or the age of postmodern aesthetics; each indexes a host of technological desires, 
fears and histories. The commonplace functioning of institutions such as hospitals, 
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classrooms, governments, the media, banks, airports, prisons, supermarkets, factories, 
cinemas and universities are all dependent on technologies which have radically altered 
human relationships with them and their institutional practices and ideologies. The braindead 
patient in Intensive Care kept alive on a life support system, the investment broker dealing 
with huge sums of capital in different currencies flowing through information webs, the 
airtraffic controller guiding one hundred jets into a busy airport, the taken-for-granted security 
cameras filming us in daily life, the drug testing programmes in international sporting events 
catching out the illegally-enhanced athletes, gender-reassignment patients undergoing 
surgery: all of the concepts these practices embody are specific to a high-technology, post-
industrial society. This does not deny the historicity of these practices; rather such historical 
concepts as 'aliveness', 'capital' and 'gender' are radically challenged by technologies, and 
some new practices are only comprehensible in terms of these technologies. 
Perhaps the most salient factor of these recent technological practices is their 
challenge to the old and familiar western logocentric orderings of the world by oppositional 
categories; where one term is described by its juxtaposition and differentiation from the other. 
The guarantee of order, harmony and naturalness provided by western oppositional 
categories strains to secure these new social practices. Whereas, for instance, 'aliveness' 
was once guaranteed by its opposite of 'deadness', for a patient in Intensive Care, lack of 
aliveness must be tested with sophisticated machinery and even then we are uncertain when 
to turn off the respirator. Yet technologies are persistently contextualised within these 
dualisms which inevitably posit nature and culture, self and other, male and female as 
mutually constitutive, yet separate and hierarchised categories in spite of helping to erode the 
certainty of many of these and other metaphysical distinctions. When is our patient alive or 
dead, male or female? How is money real and its worth gauged when it is so light, fast and 
virtual? What is a 'natural' athlete when athletes are so reliant on technologies? And 
technologies are intrinsic to the process of discovery of other technologies, hidden in the 
bloodstream of society. What do 'distance' or 'time' mean with instantaneous communication? 
What constitutes privacy and aloneness when we are increasingly monitored by technologies 
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in daily life? How can ontology deal with the technological challenges to the self-defining, 
discrete, humanist subject? 
Given the impact of technology on modern cultural and social life, its intimacy with our 
bodies, and its huge presence in the western cultural imagination, it is hardly surprising that 
technologies are couched in passionate narratives. As these narratives are promulgated by 
various competing powerful interests, they offer a rich, contradictory, worried and excited 
template for the potential cultural and social advantages, disadvantages, and implications of 
technocultural change. As a result, technologies have become both appealing and frightening 
within a culture that falls in thrall to their associated promises. The cultural logic which 
produces them is difficult to avoid. This cultural logic often produces poor descriptions of 
technologies and culture characterised by mainstream oppositional politics and narratives 
inherited from the modernist project. Mainstream oppositional politics make it difficult to talk 
about technoculture in subtle ways. Perhaps the clearest expression of this is in the way the 
subtleties of arguments about technology and culture are so often erased by the creation of an 
antagonistic and artificial dialectic comprised of 'technoutopians' (those for whom, broadly 
speaking, technologies are positive and intrinsic to social 'progress') and 'technophobes' 
(signalled by a suspicious and paranoid attitude towards what is seen as the unrelentless 
juggernaut of technological 'progress'). These categories are often accompanied by 'speaking 
rights' insofar as the field is divided into experts and nonexperts, scientists and nonscientists; 
those who are allowed to comment on complex expert systems and those who are not. The 
terms 'technophobic' and 'technoutopian' are used with real critical suspicion: their artificiality 
is signalled by the fact that no-one seriously calls herself technophobic or technoutopian. Just 
as the expression 'political correctness'-with all of its connotations of self-sati sf ied moral 
rigidity and unthinking adoption of cultural regulations-is used as a powerful invalidatory 
rhetorical strategy by diverse, interested groups, so the terms technoutopian and 
technophobic are used as stock dialectical fodder to advance the arguments of diverse 
groups, keen to erase objecting or dissenting view points, keen to maintain hegemonic power 
structures. Nonetheless, the existence of these rhetorical strategies powerfully signals deep 
societal concerns about technoculture. These concerns are shot through with symptoms of 
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technocultural euphoria and angst, and make technologies, a hot topic for academic critical 
enquiry, popular culture media extravaganzas and advertising industry utopian narratives 
alike, a passionate, ambivalent and complex social and cultural field. 
I will base part of this critical enquiry into technoculture in science fiction. The 
technological imaginary is expressed well in science fiction texts which offer rich resources for 
revealing cultural anxieties and desires inherent in technological change. Additionally, many of 
the favourite tropes and narrative ideologies from science fiction bleed over into more 
'mainstream' technocultural texts about technocultural or technoscientific 'reality'. (Or 
alternatively science fiction's favoured tropes are implicit in broader culture; tracking the 
direction of influence is unimportant here.) What this does emphasise is that technoculture is 
a realm where facts, figures and fantasies are all implicit in one another. Additionally, sf offers 
a mode of perception of the world which makes more readily explicit the conjoining of fact and 
fantasy implicit in the epistemological, generic categories of science and fiction which are 
usually treated as distinct and separate cultural productions. However, this work will show the 
discursive realm of technoculture is full of instances where science and fiction are deeply 
intimate bedfellows. A science fictional mode of perception offers a useful critical practice in 
re-visioning our current technocultural moment for its cultural fusions and fault lines which are 
often sealed over by legitimating narratives. According to the critic Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, sf 
is premised on 'a pair of gaps': 'the gap between belief in the immanent possibility (and 
perhaps inexorable necessity) of those tran sf ormations on the one hand and reflection about 
their possible ethical, social, and spiritual interpretation (i.e. "their embeddedness in a web of 
social-historical relations)3 , on the other. Useful critical practices aside, the success of this 
mode of perception as put into practice in sf texts, depends heavily on dominant ideologies 
and their concomitant fears and desires which sf texts promulgate. In this way, many sf texts 
recuperate and disguise dominant cultural narratives rather than exposing the 
constructedness of notions of science and fiction. Mark Jenkins describes the movement as 
'the paradigm of fragmentation and recapture,' where the sf films initially represent a more 
socially fragmented world but, as they move towards narrative resolution, the subject is 
reintegrated into stable and reassuring logics of unitary identity. Hence these films recapture 
- 8 -
conservative, modernist ideologies. This notion will form part of my critique of three dystopian 
sf films, Metropolis, Blade Runner and Gattaca. 
Taking into account the epistemological and technological challenges posed to these 
conservative politics, it is surprising the degree to which 'mainstream' or dominant 
technoculture recuperates highly conservative ideologies. This, in spite of technoculture being 
perceived as a vanguardist realm, where cutting edge technologies and practices are hacked 
out in a spirit of constant innovation. As logocentrism describes not only a taxonomy, but also 
a process, it is able to resist denaturalisation and politicisation even within the technocultural 
realm. 
This study will draw from such excellent criticism as written by Andrew Ross and 
Donna Haraway who each emphasise that technologies are 'a fully cultural process, soaked 
through with social meaning'. These cultural processes help disguise and sustain privileges 
and practices of power which are difficult to critique as they have become so absorbed into 
the cultural bedrock as to be invisible and imply a commonsensical self-evidence. For this 
reason, anyone seriously attempting to deconstruct technocultural texts takes on the 
mammoth task of deconstructing culture itself: technoculture can be technoscientific, 
technofascist, technofeminist, and even technologocentrist; it can be about horror shows, 
eugenics, and fears about monsters, the military industrial complex, fantasies of power over 
life, the oppressed factory worker for whom life is determined by the movement of the 
machines, and the exaltation and transcendence of the sublime. So this analysis will dip into a 
variety of cultural meanings. Above all my stress is on the tension between the challenges to 
old metanarratives and logocentrism which are provided by technologies, on the one hand 
and, on the other, the ways in which 'troubling complexities' are often simplified, repressed 
and subsumed into a new metanarrative about technologies.4 
My agenda does not involve demonising technologies or technocultural texts by 
leaving behind some of the passions, promises and delights of these potentially life-changing 
artifacts, but rather it subjects them to a cultural contextualisation that examines interwoven 
strands of narrative and figuration. As Donna Haraway and other feminists involved in this 
field urge for more nuanced accounts of mediation, rather than more narratives which further 
- 9 -
shore up dominations and hierarchies. These accounts should not baulk at the prospect of 
partial new ontologies but should have a commitment to situating knowledges; a feminist 
practice of objectivity. In Joanna Russ's The Female Man one of the characters asks' I know 
who I am, but what's my brand name?'5 Brand names are logotypes and, as such, can also be 
seen as the logos circulating according to principles of exchange in the technocultural 
economy. Just as a snake cell can be imprinted with a corporation's name in Blade Runner, 
soon 'our' genes will also be coded and patented and brand names will be of increasing 
importance. Asking what our brand names are may not sound as far-fetched or science 
fictional as may initially seem. 
The first chapter will provide a general overview of some of the ways in which science 
and technologies are popularly represented and narrated within popular culture magazines. 
This work makes no claim of providing an exhaustive or thick summary of these narratives, 
rather the focus is on their historical contingency and the way in which disjunctions are 
registered through tropes and narrative palimpsests. From a Baconian colonisation of nature 
as a female body to the cloning of a marginalised aesthetic in Wired magazine, reading the 
cultural narrative implicit in these technologies enables a cultural contextualisation which 
factors out the logocentric process. 
In Chapter two I will provide a theoretical basis to the critical readings. To examine 
the effect of these narratives on the construction of the self, various figurations of 
technocultural identity, identity formations, how they are constructed and performed and how 
they are shaped by dominant narratives. The most potent figure of Western culture is that of 
humanist Man. Logocentrism works in the services of maintaining this figure's ascendancy in 
the world in spite of the challenges posed by re-orderings, technological or otherwise. This 
identity is also a hybrid of parts, and contains such historical figures as Man the Enlightened 
Philosopher and Scientist with dominion over his world, separate and complete in himself, 
Man™, as Donna Haraway calls him, that creature who may soon fulfil millennial dreams to 
decode and patent his very genes as a perfect, untroubled picture of 'Life Itself', to homo 
sapiens, that creature from evolutionary narratives, to various other old versions of 'ourselves' 
as Man. Working in opposition to this are new figurations for complex, technologically-
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implicated identity which, as Haraway proposes, might yet teach us 'from our fusions with 
animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of western logos' 
Chapter three begins with a detour into the space race and NASA's Star wars 
programme to show the degree to which popular narratives about science and technology are 
influenced by science fictional notions but in particular historically-derived American 
Technological Sublime. The technological sublime has been an important part of the securing 
of American power in the technological imaginary and has involved the conquering of land and 
the colonising of new territories, such as under the sea or outer space. The sublime, has thus, 
helped produce the reassuring logics of humanist Man's identity in his universe. Yet now 
genetic technologies allow Man to travel into himself and provides a challenge to this system 
to rethink his paradigms. The film manages this contradictory movement by creating a gap 
between 'good technologies' and 'bad' technologies into which the American individualistic 
figure of man may be reinserted .. 
In Chapter four, I discuss how the shoring up of the dominion over the rest of the 
world has traditionally involved using technologies for Man's benefit. However, the films, 
Metropolis and Blade Runner, show how hi-tech Woman is also used as an instrument, or 
technology, of Man's self-assertion. The anxieties associated with this process manifest 
themselves in anxious gender performances. I will discuss these issues by initially using the 
dual figure of Maria from Metropolis as a starting point into the deep misogyny in 
technoculture, and branching out to the female replicants in Blade Runner and a few other 
exemplary texts. 
Finally, in Chapter five I look at two texts which do attempt to provide new figurations 
for identity other than those which 'recapture' Man and his attendant logocentrism. They also 
illustrate the problems of doing so, in terms of a postmodern loss of origins and any residual 
sense of authenticity left after the body as been thoroughly prostheticised. William Gibson's 
Neuromancer exemplifies cyberpunk's concern with prostheses, enhanced bodies, variable 
human-machine states, and loss of origins. Within the novel, he shows how 'place' is a 
technology which interpolates subjects into various figurations. Samuel Delany's novel, Stars 
in my Pocket Like Grains of Sand, explicitly articulates a dualism between located 
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knowledges and a disruptive radical relativism through the representation of Rat, a radically 
constructed cyborg figure. Both Neuromancer and Stars in my Pocket Like Grains of Sand, 
offer a postmodern response to the many modernist notions which underwrite the narratives of 
technology, science, and the figure of Man and form a part of my critique of technoculture. 
However, just as these texts present new ways of being in a new world, they also 
problematise these new ways and present various dangers implicit in the loss of a fixed 
embodiment. 
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Chapter One: Popular Culture TechnoScience 
If technologies ... might be partially understood as formalizations ... they should also be 
viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings 
-Donna Haraway, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs' 
In 1527 Francis Bacon published his utopian essay New Atlantis wherein voyagers 
who have travelled to the far reaches of the exotic South Seas find an uncharted island where 
sciences and technologies are foremost in the organisation of life. 'Among the excellent acts 
of that King,' writes Bacon, 'one above all hath the pre-eminence. It was the erection and 
institution of an order, or society, which we call Saloman's House, the noblest foundation, as 
we think, that ever was upon the earth, and the lantern of this kingdom'. In this House all kinds 
of sciences are practised and governed by the notion that: 'The end of our foundation is the 
knowledge of causes and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human 
empire, to the effecting of all things possible.' 6 The whole tale, read as a trope for our 
historically-derived view of science and technology, is rich in the narratives of human 
progress, epic and heroic adventures, Enlightenment philosophy, Christianity, and gendered 
notions of the world, amongst others things. In this didactic tale, Bacon portrays science as a 
hallowed realm. It is practised with the attention to ceremony, orders and hierarchy like a 
religion. And like religion, science increases our understanding of secret things and motions 
which in turn secures and increases Man's7 dominion over the natural world. To complete the 
picture, Bacon stresses the ethical adherence to Truth where the clear ideas distilled from 
these scientific processes must find their expression, as 'we do hate all impostures and lies, 
inasmuch as we have severely forbidden it to all our fellows, under pain of ignominy and fines, 
that they do not show any natural work or thing adorned or swelling, but only pure as it is, and 
without all affectation of strangeness'.8 
Bacon's hugely influential claim-that science is about truth-telling and the finding of 
secrets, that it is outside the cultural process from which it arises, that it is a hallowed realm 
commensurable to a religion, and that to get to this realm involves heroics and conquest of the 
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natural world-is also the claim that science inhabits a fantastic realm which Haraway has 
referred to as the 'culture of no culture'. As feminist and historical rereadings of science 
become more common, it becomes clear not only the degree to which Bacon's method and 
beliefs about science have influenced our own, but also how they disguise many repressed 
ideologies; left submerged beneath scientific practice and explanation. Like Bacon, 
technoscientific texts, as well as many other kinds of texts, commonly contextualise nature as 
an uncharted territory, with implicitly deep secrets to be revealed by the probings of 
adventurous men. This representation buys into deeply logocentric, sexist and colonial 
explaining narratives, the world as an ordered, stable place where progress may take place. 
Complexity is consistently subsumed into these organising principles. 
The feminist historian of science Evelyn Fox Keller discusses the recurrent theme of 
conquest in relation to objects of study and, in particular, toward Nature which is often 
described as an exotic, eroticised female body. She calls this rhetoric process the 
'genderisation of science' 9: 
To see the emphasis on power and control so prevalent in the rhetoric of Western 
science as projection of a specifically male consciousness requires no great leap of the 
imagination. Indeed, the perception has become a commonplace. Above all it is invited 
by the rhetoric that conjoins the domination of nature with the insistent image of nature 
as female, nowhere more familiar than in the writings of Francis Bacon. For Bacon, 
knowledge and power are one, and the promise of science is expressed as 'leading to 
you Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave', by 
means that do not 'merely exert a gentle guidance over Nature's course; they have the 
power to conquer and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations'. 10 
This kind of Baconian rhetoric is evident in a special 'Discovery Issue' of TIME 
magazine (summer 1997/98). Entitled 'The New Age of Discovery': 'From asteroid to ocean 
floor, from genetics to gamma rays-a celebration of mankind's urge to explore', the cover 
shows a superimposed photo of a giant baby orbiting diminutive planet earth. The picture 
conflates three concepts into one: not only is the baby in outer space, and seemingly crawling 
over earth as he might over an inflatable beachball (here space is the 'old' playground of 
technoscientific progress), he is also happily 'swimming' in one of the new uncharted 
territories which takes man back from whence he has come in his history of evolution. Behind 
him the sun is rising symbolising the dawning of this new age. This young (man) child of the 
late second millennium, the cover suggests, is 'going where no man has gone before.'11 But 
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what kind of a celebration of discovery is implicit here? Are these new lands really so blank 
that they may be effortlessly appropriated into the scientific discourse? What kind of narrative 
is on sale? What kind of identities fit into this narrative? The baby's whiteness, his symbolising 
new birth and hope and his pre-lapsarian wonder and innocence, are neatly conflated with 
'discovery' in the image. Just as it is natural for a baby to wonder at the world around it and 
explore, so the practices of technoscience are natural and, hence, inevitable. Mankind's 
[inherent] urge to explore is being celebrated. According to the editorial, the new age of 
discovery will chart 'evolution, genetics, computing and cosmology'. These areas are the 
technoscientific playground in which mankind may 'discover' new immutable laws. And just as 
this issue of TIME is an implicit celebration of (white) 'mankind's urge' to explore, out of the 
seventeen special contributors, only two are women. Diane Ackerman, a self-described 'poet, 
essayist and naturalist', (that is to say, she is not a real scientist like most of the other 
contributors and writes, therefore, from the margins) marvels at 'the wonders of everyday life' 
in her article, and voices concerns traditionally associated with femininity and nature. Yet she 
offers arguably the most insightful analysis of technoculture within the magazine. She writes: 
'There's bound to be a simple answer to everything, we insist. Maybe not. Maybe complexity 
frightens us. Maybe we fear becoming as plural as all we survey.' (11) Ackerman is right, and 
the issue of TIME magazine to which she has contributed is a case in point. 
Her comment runs directly counter to a quotation by staff researcher Sian Best in the 
editorial: 'I was struck by how important the camera is as an instrument of enlightenment'. It is 
a comment evocative of Enlightenment ethics, where vision (the camera) was an instrument 
(a social technology, even) for containing and ordering the world. The feminist Rey Chow 
goes further in characterising vision and the twentieth century's 'preoccupation with the 
"visual"' and 'the perfection of technologies of visuality such as photography and film' which 
she sees as indicative of a 'dominant discourse of modernity [which] reveals epistemological 
problems that are inherent in social relations and their reproduction. Such problems inform the 
many ways social difference-be it in terms of class, gender, or race-is constructed.' 12 
Reminiscent of Chow's argument, Descartes' famous dictum 'I am lord and master of all I 
survey' invokes similar ethics to 'mankind's [natural] urge to explore' which reveals, as Chow 
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rightly points out, the dominant discourse of modernity reproducing social relations. In the 
TIME article, the notion of 'lord and master' carry authority historically, while here the authority 
of 'mankind' is in his genes. Overlaying this notion is the powerful image of the innocent child 
which by infantilising also detraumatises the menacing undertones of this historical shift. 
It is difficult not to notice the Baconian rhetorics of colonisation, racism and sexism-
and other logocentric metanarratives-inherent in many of the articles. For example, in an 
article on the 'cornucopia of secrets' Amazon rainforests are tellingly described as Kurtzian 
'untamed Edens', 'dark and mysterious', the 'last frontiers', 'fecund', 'treasure trove[s]' whose 
secrets need to be 'bioprospected' and stored in 'comprehensive computer databases' despite 
the 'perilous climb to the canopy' necessary to study them. (Pp37-9). Another story reveals 
the dominance of scientific discourse in suppressing complexity. The TIMEline plots a history 
of 'mankind's' achievements in the realms of discovery and inventions. There is not a single 
female philosopher or scientist present. In fact, the only inclusions of females-both 
representing 'mankind's' conquest over nature-are Louise Brown, the first test-tube baby 
and, remarkably, Dolly, the first cloned sheep. Thus TIME's narratives may be read as 
technologocentrist: contingent, arbitrary and non-innocent (unlike the 'baby' symbol which by 
representing uncultured innocence so powerfully, enacts symbolically its own process of 
repression). While technoscientific ideologies did not simply appear out of the primordial ooze 
with Man's ancestors, the facile assumption guaranteeing the authority of TIME's analysis of 
nature amounts to the same thing. Nature and its corresponding naturalness in the world is 
immutable, essential and, hence, beyond questioning. It is all there if we can just discover it. 
The philosophical guarantee that modernity provides enables these narratives to seem true 
and self-evident13. 
The trope of the baby is recycled to powerful effect in New Scientist's 1998 'Evolution 
is Dead' issue. 14 The cover shows a small naked and white baby boy solemnly throwing up his 
arms in protest at the approach of a menacing pair of gloved hands which grasp a huge 
wrench in one hand (which seems to be on the point of cruelly pinching the baby's soft arm) 
and a giant hammer in the other. The photo is darkly lit with atmospheric shadows that create 
more of the aura of a horror show than the aseptic world of biotech laboratories. Surrounding 
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the baby is an array of various limbs and organs; body parts which, presumably, the gloved 
hands may choose to attach to the baby after wrenching off his 'natural' ones. The large title 
'Evolution is Dead' evokes the immensity and trauma of a Nietzschean 'God is dead' in terms 
of cultural and social watersheds. In contrast, the subtitle 'The Germline Gene Therapy 
Debate', superimposed over the baby's body, seems to be in contradiction to what is going on 
in the picture. These hands look more like those of a killer (somebody who would 'murder' 
evolution, perhaps) than someone who is going to perform 'therapy' on the child. The picture 
expresses repressed cultural fears which are more resonant of the anxious term 'genetic 
engineering' than in its hygienic replacement 'genetic therapy' which is used in this article. It is 
perhaps for this reason that the word 'gene' of the subtitle half-covers the baby's penis like a 
fig leaf. In this world where evolution is dead, the penis is no longer the primary vessel for the 
tran sf erence of life or the seat of 'natural' reproductive power. If we read this as the gene 
replacing the symbolic penis, or a threat to phallogocentrism in the cultural order of things, 
then it offers a powerful trope for technologically-mediated social change. So if the semiotics 
of the picture represent the protest by the sovereign, stable subject towards the technological 
invasion of his power (symbolised inexorably by the replacement of the phallus by the gene), 
then this is in surprising contradiction with the contents of the article itself. The article begins: 
If you put your ear to the tracks, you can hear the train coming. 
In conference halls around the world, geneticists and developmental biologists have 
been gathering to discuss what was once unthinkable-genetically engineering human 
embryos so that they, and their children and their children's children, are irrevocably 
changed. These experts are talking with remarkable candour about using germ-line 
engineering to cure fatal diseases or even to create designer babies that will be smarter 
stronger or more resistant to infections.15 
Although the cultural anxiety on the magazine's cover suggests invasion, menace, 
horror shows, the erosion of power of the subject as represented by the phallus, the article 
nevertheless only partially addresses these fears. After all, this technology is as exciting and 
sublime as a train rushing full speed ahead into a brighter future. The problems the author 
presents are mainly technical ones; for instance, of finishing the gene sequencing begun by 
the Human Genome Project, of finding better ways to insert switches into the genetic code 
which can be manipulated later in life. These sequencings are problematic, he concedes, and 
will have to be extensively cross-referenced to all types of personality functions. Hence, the 
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difficulties are principally described as a problem of cryptography-a problem of discovering 
the right code. Socially, the article concedes that the pressure of the market may also cause a 
problem, too, the article concedes. Parents may want designer babies 'to give them an edge 
over the child at the next desk, or to stop them from being homosexual.' Hence, the article's 
latent homophobia finds its casual expression in this way. The question of 'being something', 
whether a homosexual, or a blue-eyed blond, becomes a question of social codes which are 
either violated or confirmed by the genetic choices parents make. However, parents who want 
'designer babies' are ultimately applauded as forward thinkers who embrace 'the future'. Even 
though the article attempts to justify the need for these technologies in terms of disease 
prevention, this is shot through with symptoms of a drive to suppress diversity and thus 
complexity; to (re)produce the Sacred image of the Same, albeit through 'unnatural' means. 
Thus the challenge to the humanist subject is how to resolve the desire for the perfect 
re-creation of unity and sameness with 'unnatural' means. In this article the rhetorical 
strategies which implicitly justify this desire derive from the interwoven strands of 
technological progress and the technological sublime (which will be a crucial part of my 
analysis in chapter three). These are powerful legacies of modernity and the Industrial 
Revolution and are implicit in many writings on technoscientific research. 
Ultimately, these narratives allow the article to side-step addressing fraught ethical 
and philosophical questions which would be required to explain the cultural anxieties 
represented on the cover. In order to expel these anxieties, the author Robert Taylor uses a 
popularised technological determinism to its fullest potential combined with an evocation of 
the sublime. Accordingly, the article ends with: 'It no longer makes sense to shy away from 
discussing what we're going to do when all the technical obstacles are overcome, and genetic 
engineering offers us the profound power to sculpt our children--and the future of our species'. 
This final authorial comment contains both an appeal to common sense and echoes other 
quotes in the body of the text, like that of Gregory Stock: 'There is no way to avoid this 
technology. The knowledge is coming too fast and the possibilities are too exciting.' 
Another TIME special issue, focuses on 'The Future of Medicine: How Genetic 
Engineering will change us in the Next Century'. 16 Once again the cover offers a rich source of 
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cultural comment. A beady-eyed green snake hisses from the cover, its body wrapped around 
a stumpy tree trunk which, together with the emblem of the spiralled DNA helix, indicates that 
genetics bears the indelible stamp of western religion and its fears. As is the picture, the 
snake is inseparable from the representation of the helix. Inside the magazine is a picture of a 
'real' DNA helix, subtitled 'Life Itself. After all the talk of codes and switches, its lack of rigid 
geometry seems surprising. This tiny shape, revealed to us by powerful microscopes, is our 
new trope for life itself found through technology. The helix represents the longed-for dream of 
the 'foundation of unity and diversity', where certainty of artefacts and organisms is 
tantalisingly held out for millennial hopes and anxieties. There is an artificial neatness in the 
tran sf ormation of the Modernist Project into the Human Genome Project in terms of cultural 
history. Rey Chow points out that there are 'globalized and popularized usages of terms such 
as "modernity" and "modernization," which pertain to the increasing technologization of 
culture.'17 She argues that modernity is culturally embedded in modernisation, or 
technologisation. In this case, the transmogrification of the genome into the site of secrets 
which can sati sf y the centuries-old cultural longing for foundational answers about 'Life 
Itself. This is taking place amid the hyped corporate hunger for profit from biology and 
biotechnology. The materialized hopes of the Enlightenment: to look inside the human and 
discover a// his secrets, of finding the Master Code, of discovering other aberrant codes linked 
to thicker, more problematic dysfunctions, finds expression in this way. 
It is telling that the TIMEline of the evolution of the gene in science and culture 
focuses on disease, forensics and commerce which, in turn, become the semiotic in which this 
new symbol, a metonym for life, circulates. In terms of the various Human Genome Projects, 
the work at present is one of scientific cryptography. The stem, crypto- meaning the reading of 
secrets, hidden and concealed, which form 'cryptography'; the science of deciphering codes. 
This cryptography is not about transmitting wartime secrets, strategies, and orders, although it 
may as well be as this code, 'the code of all codes', is the code of 'Life Itself on planet Earth 
and has the potential power to radically tran sf orm lives in inconceivable ways. The narratives 
that are important to deciphering the Genome Project are those which are implicit in 
technoscientific research, the notion of progress and of a 'race', the demands of capitalism 
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and social ideologies which are latent in the private sector's interest in, what TIME calls, 'the 
most intriguing genes'. It would appear that not all genes are equal. Government-sponsored 
scientists are left to work on sequencing the less intriguing. Some genes are more intriguing in 
the eyes of private sector research precisely because social interests and their extant 
commercial interests are not all equal. In the face of these developments, legal codes must 
also be developed. The sole reason for private biotechnology films spending large sums of 
money on sequencing the genome is to gain patents in order to have a captive and 
monopolistic market. Having patented some small part of the puzzle, they will be able legally 
to own part of this vision of 'Life Itself. To have definitively conquered part of nature the 
process of genome mapping is looking, probing, sequencing, discovering, competing, and, 
finally, patenting the map. The next stage is reading the codes and finding out what they 
mean. Like any research and development, the secrecy within which the mapping of 'Life 
Itself is shrouded is similar to that surrounding state secrets. Discovering 'Life Itself is based 
in the fusion of old-fashioned Man, Man™ as a genetic commodity, and Homo sapiens, the 
creature of science with his history of evolution. 
Although I am not in a position to critique the scientific methodology of the Human 
Genome Project, the various assumptions and practices that go into the translation of life into 
informatics, into commerce and its re-visioning in cultural narratives are framed by cultural 
codes which are deeply evocative of historical ethics, ideologies and conceptions of the 
category of humanness. Donna Haraway explains how the Project itself is possible only by the 
fact that 'Much of the history of genetics since the 1950's is the history of the consolidation 
and elaboration of the equation "gene = information." Data Bases are not epistemologically 
neutral creations, she shows. They also have their codes which are manifest in various design 
features, structures, factors, coefficients and queries that meet specified conditions. 
Datal;>ases are part of the logic of informatics. All of these choices have their functions and 
limitations. They do not provide a crystal clear outlook on the world, not a unifying and 
foundational picture as these articles suggest. 
However surprising and disappointing it may seem, the narratives that TIME and New 
Scientist use in abundance, are also those used by the United States Department of Energy in 
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its official public access homepage: 'To Know Ourselves'. This web page was created in 1996 
to explain the Human Genome Project to the rest of the world and as an 'account of work' 
sponsored by the U.S Government.18 'Account' is an interesting term to use as its references 
are so wide. It has origins in both calculation and narration, but accountability also implies 
responsibility through location and transparency. 'To know Ourselves' does not seem to fulfill 
this promise of responsible narration. The homepage begins by explaining how the project 
initially began as a 'promised tool for assessing mutation rates of survivors of the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki bombings and their descendants.' The project is a direct descendent of horrific 
wartime devastation and the search for gene mutations that resulted from exposure to 
radiation. However, the remapping of origins the project undergoes is quite surprising. Under 
the rubric 'Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications', the writers wax lyrical in a way that is 
strongly reminiscent of Bacon and is worth quoting at length: 
The Age of Discovery was the Age of da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan, an era when 
European civilization reached out to the Far East and thus filled many of the voids in its 
map of the world. But in a larger sense, we have never ceased from our exploration and 
discovery. Science has been unstinting over the ages in its efforts to complete our 
intellectual picture of the universe. In this century, our explorations have extended from 
the subatomic to the cosmic, as we have mapped the heavens to their farthest reaches 
and charted the properties of the most fleeting elementary particles. Nor have we 
neglected to look inward, seeking, as it were, to define the topography of the human 
body. Beginning with the first modern anatomical studies in the sixteenth century, we 
have added dramatically to our picture of human anatomy, physiology, and 
biochemistry. The Human Genome Project is thus the next stage in an epic voyage of 
discovery-a voyage that will bring us to a profound understanding of human biology. 
So while the Home Page begins by explaining the project's origins in research into 
mutant genes of survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, (where mapping was 
critically important to succes sf ul bombing), it ends with a comparison to the mapping of the 
New World. This is a cleaned-up version of mapping suitable for a heroic and Baconian 
scientist. The narrative map the writers create of the Project mythology does not include 
histories of devastation: these histories have become the new 'uncharted voids' on the map of 
technoscientific progress. Science, in this picture of the world, is the 'unstinting' taskmaster 
who is both outside 'us' ('its efforts') and is 'us' ('our explorations'). This explanation also 
reveals who is excluded from 'us' in this scientific fantasy: those from the 'Far East' are not 
'us', they fill the 'voids' on 'our map'. Mapping, then, is a powerful metaphor for power that 
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cannot be disassociated from colonialism, from bombing, from political practices and their 
material consequences. Yet mapping is what the Genome Project is all about. It is 
extraordinary that this state funded 'exploration' into the heart of cultural notions of identity is 
not more self-conscious about its troping and extant cultural narratives. Even if this web page 
is only a very small portal into the more detailed research being done by the US Department 
of Energy, as the official account it creates an authoritative narrative map that influences how 
this important work is thought about in culture. 
Writing about boundary figures which are traditionally off the map, the realm of 
monsters and lab rats, poses few rhetorical problems here. In another page entitled 'Mighty 
Mouse', the writers explain the experiments on transgenic mice which have designer 
mutations in their genetic structure to allow researchers to study the effect of defects that 
mimic those found in human patients. Once again, the practice is cleaned up of its potentially 
fearful overtones, replete with anxieties surrounding border crossings, death, and monsters. 
Mighty Mouse, the article seems to suggest, is as All-American, hopeful, and innocuous as his 
rhetorical companion Micky Mouse. By this move, the historical space of the laboratory 
morphes into the postmodern hyper-real space of Disneyland where visitors may leave their 
worries behind. The laboratory space, which Haraway refers to as a 'theatre of persuasion,' is 
also a theatre of the culturally unnatural, the uncanny, the transgressive, and transgenic, 
where monsters and vampires coexist. 'I am drawn to the laboratory for this essential 
narrative of epistemological and material power. How could feminists and antiracists in this 
culture do without the power of the laboratory to make the normal dubious?' 19 The opposite 
strategy, of making the dubious normal, even heroic, is the rhetorical move of the Human 
Genome Project homepage, symbolised so potently in the choice of the Mighty Mouse figure 
as mascot. 
Finally, it is deeply revealing of this ethical system that the only potentially negative 
social implication to which the Project homepage draws attention is the problem of privacy 
and ownership of genetic information. Genetic privacy is something which must be 
safeguarded warns the Project. While it is clear that this is an issue which demands serious 
consideration, more profoundly, it is revealing of the kind of social system that the Project 
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assumes. This social system is fervently individualistic, Western and 'First World' where 
property rights are immanent in social identity and, now with the age of the patented gene, 
property rights are also immanent in ontology also: this is the commercial patented heart of 
Man™.20 In the 'Cyborg Manifesto,' Haraway describes this system: 'The proper state for a 
Western person is to have ownership of the self, to have and hold a core identity as if it were a 
possession. That possession may be made from various raw materials over time, that is, it 
may be a cultural production, or one may be born with it .... Not to have property in the self is 
not to be a subject, and so not to have agency.'21 This lack of agency is tied to the ability to 
exercise property rights which is linked, in turn, to literacy, class, race, in short to access to 
various power formations. It is a fraught uneven ground. The Human Genome Project does 
not consider a social system where groups matter, rather society is a collection of property-
owning individuals, who each own and have the responsibility of guarding their own genetic 
information. 
These dominant ideals of technoscientific progress yield interesting contrasts with the 
more cynical and self-styled 'countercultural' perspective as represented in the pages of 
Mondo2000 and Wired magazine. What these representations do share is an understanding 
of technology's embeddedness in commercial interests and its relationship to individualism 
and private property. Perhaps nowhere are these three concepts more securely fused and 
celebrated than in the pages of Wired magazine. Both Wired and Mondo2000 carry 
technology-love to the level of fetishism and the slick, ultra-hip rhetorics favoured by these 
publications are highly seductive. While Wired is clearly more mainstream than Mondo2000, 
they each borrow from technoculture's hip, beatnik underbelly to sell their cultural narratives. 
The result is a perverse reading. Film critic Vivian Sobchack, despairingly confides her love-
hate relationship with Mondo2000,: 'I am drawn to Mondo2000, I realize, because it appeals to 
the worst in me, the laziest in me, the cheapest in me. In my sober and responsible moments, 
I bemoan our culture's loss of gravity and fear the very real social dangers of disembodied 
ditziness, but holding this Christmas present to myself, all I want is a head shot.'22 
Mondo2000's heady mixture of postmodern irony, consumerism, easy indulgences, 
disaffection and jokiness makes it difficult to critique as it backs away from any firm 
- 23 -
commitments, political or otherwise. Yet beneath the surface of the slick pages-featuring 
articles proselytising synthetic hallucinogens, the future of teledildonics, brain implants, 
hackers and crackers, and the music of DNA, all edited by R.U. Sirius and Queen Mu- hides 
'privileged, selfish, consumer-oriented, technologically dependent libertarianism [and] 
irresponsible individualism', invects Sobchack. (18) The dark fantasies offered by cyberpunk 
may well provide the necessary glamorous beatnik narrative, but, as a contributor on the 
WELL has noted, 'I don't think there's really a subculture of smart-drugged, outlaw UNIX 
programmers listening to M.C 900 Foot Jesus and Boiled in Lead and going out to multimedia 
performance installations every night'.23 While this contributor is primarily interested in 
disproving the reality and authenticity of cyberpunk pretenders, his referencing of the 
technologically literate to 'UNIX programmers' is telling of the kind of people who have 
technological access and buying power. So even while texts like Mondo2000 embrace 
marginality and countercultural urges, and, while the people who consume these technologies 
may like to think of themselves as emanating the disaffection of the cyberpunk console 
cowboy, it is important to remember that this is a disguise for a very real privilege, a market 
customised for a one-size-fits-all Western capitalist consumer. UNIX programmers are usually 
middle-class, well paid, white, and in high demand on the job market. They are generally not 
fighting for their lives on mean street as these representations suggest. 
Wired magazine offers a guide to what is happening and hot in the high rollers' game 
of technological research, development, and marketing. Wired is not, as it would like to 
pretend, a hip mag for unorthodox, anti-establishment, marginalised whiz kids; rather it is the 
preferred publication of many top-end earners who are generally university educated and 
working in Information Technology. And, hence, its recurrent tropes of contamination are the 
voice of the logos creating new borders. Although Wired loves to hate Microsoft and 
chairperson Bill Gates (presumably because Microsoft represents the 'logos' in the field of 
information technology products and power, Wired would like to position itself as a counter-
cultural voice speaking out for backyard operations), hating Microsoft, being hip and having 
the slickest design pages hardly classifies it as radical even though it has an aura of that sort 
of chic. 
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This donning of a marginalised aesthetic seems particularly absurd and inappropriate 
considering the ways in which so many are genuinely excluded from the march into the bright 
new age, and also how technologies act to fortify their own exclusivity. 24 In keeping with the 
recurrent trope of mapping, poet and webmaster, Olu Oguibe, describes the creation of new 
'forsaken geographies' inhabited by 'New World Others': 'Electronic mail and the web browser 
... become veritable tools for the construction and fortification of an other world, outside the 
borders of which everything else is inevitably consigned to erasure and absence. In 
connective South Africa the majority of the population fit most perfectly into that category of 
the inconsequential revealingly known in cyberspeak as "PONA". They are, indeed, a people 
of no account'. These 'silent territories' must serve to remind us, argues Oguibe, of 'dominions 
which, though left behind in our march into a new age and a new millennium, nevertheless 
remain to invalidate our claims to progress'.25 The fascist implication of the PONA are quite 
clear; after all, cyberspace, as an example of 'progressive technologies' is only available to 
those who have computers, modems, and the necessary literacy to work them. Any 
rhapsodising of technological progress must take into account the very real technological 
social stratification that often reinforces existing social fault lines. Hence, Wired's sense of 
authoritativeness is partially derived from an unwillingness to engage sufficiently with 
technology's complex relation to social formations and privileges. 
In The Killer App: Wired Magazine, Voice of the Corporate Revolution', Keith White, 
condemningly writes: 'Wired is technology's hip face, an aggressive apologist for the new 
information capitalism that speaks to the world in the postmodern executive's favored tones of 
chaotic cool and pseudo-revolution.'26Among posturings that White lances in his wholehearted 
condemnation are the tendencies for Wired to create technoanxiety in its readership, to pen 
'gooey appreciations of Silicon Valley CEOs,' its lauding of 'macho individualism'. Of course, 
Wired is a lifestyle magazine and, as with all lifestyle magazines, it is in the business of selling 
envy and ideology as well as technologies. Its interests are apparent in the frequent blurring of 
the line between editorial, advertisement, and their strange hybrid, the infomercial. This 
reveals the corporate interests at stake which are partially disguised under a postmodern, 
disaffected, macho cool. Wired also demonstrates the way in which technologies are capitalist 
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fetishistic objects: to own the brand shiny new and state-of-the-art is also to accrue cultural 
capital. However, just as the fetish is an expression of displaced desire, the belief in the actual 
utility of many of these technologies is a manufactured and displaced desire. Because they 
express a displaced desire, the Critical Art Ensemble (CAE) argues that technologies do not 
really affect us in the way we think they do, but are the material result of the production of 
superfluous needs through capitalism which plays itself out in the acquisition of essentially 
useless objects. 27 These objects are not jerry-rigged up performance enhancing machines, as 
the cyberpunk mythology goes, but rather show their lack of utility in their very short lifespan. 
Certainly it is true that a relentless teleological narrative of obsolescence and progress does 
structure the frenetic, accelerated market of technological consumables. However, while the 
observation that the utility of some technocultural artefacts is marginal, to go as far as saying 
that they are all 'useless', as CAE does, is not helpful in delineating why culture needs them. 
The life-changing powers of these common objects may not be made explicit in their 
instruction manuals, but culture's 'use' of these objects is where their 'usefulness' lies. And as 
White disparagingly comments; the use of some of these objects has the power to turn their 
owners into 'rebel consumers'. 
Of course CAE's complaint is not really new and, in fact, could be seen as a 
rewording of the critical practice this work espouses: things are not really what they seem, and 
the realm of facts and artefacts, fantasy and science, narratives and mythologies are all fused 
despite scientific culture's attempt to shut science fiction out of the laboratory. Science is 
simply not understandable without the cultural mythologies that create its dominant knowledge 
claims. In terms of the various representations of the world, ourselves, and its relation to 
knowledge making, we can do better in finding thicker and more consequential ways of 
describing and analysing technoscientific practices and artefacts: ways that radically eschew 
distilling out the political, that take into account commercial interests and benefits, and their 
power in shaping the popular imaginary's view of science which in turn has a profound 
influence on knowledge-making. If marketing is the privileged form of commercial knowledge 
transmission, then there must be a greater awareness of its non-innocence, its lack of 
transparency, and of its power in shaping the world of biotechnology. In short there must be 
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more questioning of how and why the new age of discovery and progress carries with it Man's 
desire for the ultimate domination of nature and other cultural others. 
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Chapter Two: Technocu/ture: Narratives and Figurations 
Technology - pertaining to art or a craft, a tool. 
Logos - 1 Philosophy. Reason, regarded as the controlling principle of the universe. 2 
the divine Word; the second person of the Trinity. [C16:Gk: word, reason] a guarantor, 
keeper of the knowledge. 28 
As my critique of popular culture technoscience texts makes evident, technologies are 
embedded in a nexus of cultural narratives. These narratives do more than merely offer 
interesting representations of, or responses to, relations between practice and artefacts. 
Thinking about technologies in this way is thinking about them as tropes, whose resonances 
have become so naturalised into our socio-linguistic economy that their latent content has 
been forgotten or no longer registers. Reading technologies as tropes and narratives also 
enables us to politicise them, to situate their knowledge claims, and to denaturalise and 
unhinge the self-guaranteeing system of logocentrism. Unsurprisingly, this kind of allegorical 
reading represents a form of discomfort to logocentrism. This is because the process of 
logocentrism is bound up with privileges and practices of power. As part of a fraught semiotic 
economy, narratives are highly contingent and non-innocent and the way we are socially 
articulated as subjects is informed by this process of logocentrism. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the conjoined critical practice of reading narratives and figurations as a kind of brief 
theoretical overview to the critical practice of the whole work. 
As the most influential aspect of culture's organising urge is to establish secure 
foundations and principles through a central, unmediated, true point, the logos, logocentrism 
provides a resistance to the process of denaturalisation. '[B]eyond signs and representation', 
the logos is, 'the real and the true, the presence of being, of knowing and reality, to the mind', 
the feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz 29 argues. It is defined as the 'controlling principle of 
the universe' in philosophy, and the divine Word spoken by the son of God. 30 In keeping with 
the outcome of a grounded system of knowledge, logocentrism functions by positing a unified 
conceptual system that equates an innocent and impartial, or a mimetic, relationship between 
an 'objective' outer reality and a privileged, 'objective' system of representation. For this, 
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logocentrism relies heavily on a Cartesian logic of identity that is organised around 
hierarchised binaries such as self-other, male-female, God-man, presence-absence, nature-
culture, mind-body, human-machine. In its complete rejection of a mediated reality, this 
system problematises the politics of identity through the fraught relationship the logos has to 
Otherness. This fraught relationship is problematised by the fact that the binaries are 
hierarchies, and not real opposites. The process of logocentrism makes the 'weaker' term in 
the binary serve as a site of excess and cultural repression in order for the stronger, positive 
term to expel its unwanted difference, and so constitute itself as unmarked. This makes the 
negative, weaker term (such as female, absence, culture, body, monster) an attenuated, 
derivative term containing both 'too much' description and 'too little' 31 . This attenuated, 
derivative term is, then, a paradoxical site of deficiency and excess which threatens to disrupt 
the stability of the positive, stronger term unless the process of logocentrism is constantly 
reenacted and confirmed; whether through representations, narratives, politics or institutional 
structures. This creates a need to constantly retell the same stories as allegories of such 
things as the Baconian relation of Man to Nature, or of Science to the world, for example, in 
order to maintain stability. 
However, with the crisis of modernity in which technologies have played a significant 
part, challenges are posed to the logocentric system. Donna Haraway explains this: 
Certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been 
systematic to the logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, 
workers, animals-in short domination of all constituted as others, whose task is to 
mirror the self .... The self is the One who is not dominated ... High-tech culture 
challenges these dualisms in two intriguing ways. It is not clear who makes and who is 
made in the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and what 
body in machines that resolve into coding practices. 32 
So just as technologically-mediated change makes technoculture a powerful subset of 
dominant culture, also creates troubling identities and narratives which disrupt the stability of 
the received logocentric notions. Even though most of technoculture's privileged terms are 
similar to broader western culture's, it does have its vanguardist fringe. Yet in spite of this 
fringe and the close association of the fringe with 'the cutting edge', 'innovation', 'progress' 
and constant change, it is clear that technoculture quintessentially reflects mainstream cultural 
priorities. The process of logocentrism I am describing here is an important feature of the 
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stabilising process. However, the association with the culturally inscribed fringe or marginal 
practices does problematise easy representations and creates a sense of discomfort. On the 
cultural maps, positive and negative terms must not become mixed or contaminations result in 
the metaphors of technoculture. 
One way in which this discomfort is commonly registered is through metaphors of 
contamination and disease. For example, Wired Magazine is redolent with the metaphors of 
contamination and, accordingly, features cyberterrorists attacking data security through virus 
attacks, the civilian economy's need to be safeguarded and protected from data 
contamination, the fear of chaos and entropy which must be kept out of data perfection as 
'cellular DNA degrading into cancer [is] ... like a recording of chaos' 33. In a very similar way, the 
discursive realm of technoscience, is laden with latent cultural anxiety in the metaphors of 
miscegenation. (The 'unnatural' birthing from the mixing of orders, black with white, one 
species with another etc.)34 Shot through with the symptoms of cultural repression, these 
cases are represented in metaphors of contamination of 'natural' orders, of violence against 
purity, or of monsterishness. Even though Wired attempts to be countercultural, the process of 
logocentrism still functions by sorting out privileged terms from non-privileged terms. This is 
because logocentrism is a process, not a taxonomy. For example, if certain historical Others 
are accepted into the mainstream, then it is through the process of their being distinguished 
from even more repugnant Others: this is the way the process of logocentrism always 
reproduces its binary hierarchies through difference. Anything outside these codes of 
normality are writings of difference.35 
Similarly, the entrenched logocentrism of science and technology ensures that 
scientific and technological artefacts and practices are heavily influenced by what Donna 
Haraway describes as 'the god trick'. This 'trick', Haraway explains, involves the 'separation of 
expert knowledges from mere opinion to the legitimate knowledge for ways of life, without 
appeal to transcendent authority or to abstract certainty of any kind .... It is the founding 
gesture of the separation of the technical and the political.' 36 By removing the understanding of 
technologies from a subjective human reality fraught with desires, prejudices, and politics, and 
placing it in the realm of the highly technical and 'objectively' scientific with its own 
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transcendent laws, scientists are able to say that they are 'on the side of the objects' at the 
location of 'the culture of no culture', as Haraway describes this elevated discursive realm. 37 
Science contains its own invisible self-generating transcendent authority which has become 
institutionally naturalised and has allowed it to become promoted to the status of preferred 
spokesman, chief historical censor, and common social measurer of human achievement and 
progress without qualification. 
In spite of this elevated status of science and technologies, logocentrism does not 
achieve its 'god trick' easily or manage to place an hermetic seal over the complexity that is 
repressed in order for this 'culture of no culture' 38 to generate its generally unquestioned 
transcendent authority. Even though technologies themselves pose challenges to traditional 
logocentric dualisms, new ways of describing these artefacts and practices to maintain their 
discursive authority often rely on the process of logocentrism even though its terms have been 
altered. These technological challenges to logocentrism are both ontological and 
epistemological as, for instance, the defining characteristics of being human blur with machine 
being, the traditional powers of God are shared by the powers of technologies, the limitations 
of time and space are pushed back and old categorisations of knowledge become 
meaningless. There is a lack of ease in this process of technologically-mediated change 
which is manifested by the mingling of excitement of technology's possibilities with the huge 
cultural discomfort inherent in so much change. 
When artefacts and practices are represented by culture in such a way that denies 
their allegorical, tropic value, then the hidden ideologies which authorise them have the 
greatest investment in sustaining their logocentric Truth. However, reading them as allegories 
reveals their contradictions and ambivalences. As stories symbolising some 'other' (a/las) 
level of meaning, there is always an implicitly ironic element in allegory insofar as stories may 
be based on radically different sets of assumptions which challenge their coherence and 
stability. How these allegories and ironies are read and lived depends on the kind of 
interpretative strategy employed: what is at stake, and from what position they are viewed. 
Both are inherently perspectival. 
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Consequently, reading technoculture and technocultural artefacts as allegories is 
quite different from reading them as symbols (which is the logocentric world view). A symbolic 
reading of culture will create a coherence based on beliefs in referentiality and discreteness 
and a belief in representation's correspondence to reality. The wonderful (and terrible) thing 
about stories is that you can never really get to the end of them or entirely grasp them. The 
ethnographer James Clifford bases his critical practice on reading and writing culture as 
allegory: ethno-graphy. In his article 'On Ethnographic Allegory', Clifford makes a crucial 
distinction between symbols and allegories which is worth quoting at length: 
Allegories draw special attention to the narrative character of cultural representations, 
to the stories built into the representational process itself. It also breaks down the 
seamless quality of cultural description by adding a temporal aspect to the process of 
reading. One level of meaning in a text will always generate other levels. Thus the 
rhetoric of presence which has prevailed in much post-romantic literature (and in much 
"symbolic anthropology") is interrupted .... In ethnography the current turn to rhetoric 
coincides with a period of critical and epistemological reevaluation in which the 
constructed, imposed nature of representational authority has become unusually visible 
and contested. Allegory prompts us to say of any cultural description not "this 
represents , or symbolizes, that" but rather, "this is a (morally charged) story about that" 
Allegory and irony are frequently juxtaposed in the discursive realm of technoculture, 
as one person's allegorical truth is another's ironic judgement. For Haraway, irony carries a 
sense of embodiment, location and contingency. 
As both a symbolic and visceral site of located identity, then, the body provides an 
important political metaphor which is hotly contested by notions of cyborg figurations, as I will 
discuss shortly. Irony depends on knowledge, position, and, hence, embodiment. The more 
culturally literate, the greater the awareness of cultural location and the greater the possibility 
for the perception of irony. Paul de Man tries to capture the experience of allegory and irony 
meeting. He writes: 
the two selves ... are simultaneously present, juxtaposed within the same moment but 
as two irreconcilable and disjointed beings .. .. irony comes closer to the pattern of 
factual experience and recaptures some of the facetious of human existence. 
Essentially the mode of the present, [irony] knows neither memory nor prefigurative 
duration, whereas allegory exists entirely within an ideal time that is never here and 
now but is always a past or an endless future. Irony is a synchronic structure, while 
allegory appears as a successive mode capable of engendering duration as the illusion 
of a continuity that it knows to be illusionary39 
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Hence, the implicitly allegorical component of logocentric tropes reinforce hegemonic 
cultural narratives but, as de Man says and is made clear in the reading of cultural narratives 
in this way, there is an unreality about allegory, it yearns toward some 'ideal time' which posits 
it with 'the illusion of continuity', sustaining the illusion of a coherent representation. Irony 
attached to allegory disrupts the illusionary sense of time and representation, and better 
captures the 'inherent fictitiousness' of negotiating discourses, the material world, or, more 
specifically here, the politics of experience and of identity formation within complexly narrated 
hi-tech environments. 
So even while hegemonic narratives are constructing and reinforcing themselves 
within systems of representation, they are also simultaneously undermined at the semiotic 
level. Where logocentric cultural narratives differ from de Man's or Clifford's allegories, 
though, is that they make full claim to an empirical truth value: there is no 'illusion of a 
continuity it knows to be illusionary'. Technologocentrisms, as I will call them, take themselves 
far too seriously for that level of self-reflexive deconstruction, and this is part of the violence 
they sustain, and the desire they reveal. 
Roland Barthes explains the result of logocentric desire in Mythologies as 'the reality 
of the world [becomes] the image of the world. History into Nature.' 40 To create a distinction 
between history and nature so that they are mutually guaranteeing concepts is the fraught 
relationship of representation to reality. Whereas in the past, as James Clifford points out, 
symbolic readings of culture were unquestioned, it is more common now to have allegorical 
readings where we can say 'this is a morally-charged story about that'. 
Redefining these relationships and factoring out the logocentric process is needed to 
recontextualise identity. One way of achieving this recontextualisation is through accounts of 
nuanced mediation rather than inherently violent logocentrism. Brian Opie postulates a 
number of comparative ratios between the terms android and human, textual and real, which 
are pertinent to this work. I will focus on these relations in chapter four. Usually these terms sit 
on opposite sides of the western foundational divide as a result of the distillation of the 
mimetic from the authentic. According to this process of distillation, the android is implicitly 
posited as a 'fake' human and the textual as a 'fake' reality. Both the textual and the android 
- 33 -
lay claim to an 'ontology' which can only belong to the essential terms of the real and the 
human. The representational terms 'android' and 'text' have some of the qualities of the 
primary terms 'real' and 'human', but none of their essence, or so our traditional logocentric 
way of thinking about these concepts goes. But if we forget the essence and the divide of 
logocentrism and instead concentrate on a mediated figuration the resulting nexus of relations 
between identity and textuality might be, as Opie proposes: 
As the android is to the human, so the textual is to the real; or 
As the android is to the real, so the textual is to the human; or 
As the android is to the textual, so the real is to the human.41 
By offering relatively unspecified comparisons, (unspecified to the extent that we 
could look at each one in terms of metaphysics, ontology, epistemology or a variety of others) 
the usual binary system of differentiation, upon which logocentrism depends, is disrupted. 
Instead the mediated process through which each term functions in relation to each other term 
is stressed. 
Looking at these kinds of creations of identity, it is clear that we would not have such 
a defined notion of the human without the scary monster marking out the border where the 
human ends. Similarly, the notion of normality is inconceivable without the abnormal, the 
mentally ill, the monster, the vampire; and so on, endlessly. These dualisms are indicators of 
Western culture's problematic creation of Otherness. It is also indicative of culture's need to 
create these mythic sites for holding contradictory fears and desires together, as Roland 
Barthes has so acutely elaborated. Although technologies are helping us to redefine these 
boundaries, all too often this is achieved by the creation of an even more repugnant Other 
differentiated from the privileged terms. 
As a mythical site containing contradictory desires and fears, the monster is the 
ultimate negative term. With its associated fears and fascinations, its unstable, unacceptable 
Jack of ontology, the monster often haunts boundary crossing figurations in many popular 
culture texts. Similarly, as concerns about transgression and order become increasingly of 
concern within a culture in rapid tran sf ormation, technology has become a rich source of 
images of monsters. Freud's expression 'polymorphous perversity,' meaning a mal-integrated 
personality which is both too diffuse and too inclusive of the outside and of otherness, applies 
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precisely to the monster with its lack of a real ontology as a non-valorised term. Typically, the 
monster embodies a certain pathos in its desire and failure to be figured as human. What 
makes the monster and the cyborg so eloquent in the critique of logocentric cultural narratives 
and ideologies (consider, for instance, the impassioned and thoughtful pleas of Mary Shelley's 
monster), is the location of the monster on the cultural margins. Speaking from a place of 
despair, a geographical, social and psychological borderland where all monsters eventually go 
in these tales, the monster always demonstrates the violence of logocentric cultural 
hierarchies. 
Complexities are raised within this system by the postindustrial, postmodern new 
world ordering. The cultural shift described by postmodernism, for instance, favours pluralism, 
decentralisation, the undoing of high and low cultural boundaries and, to a degree, atomises 
cultural metanarratives. Its proximity to technology is such that the postmodern world is often 
symbolically represented by postindustrial technologies; such as the flow of information age 
data within webs, the system of satellite-linked media, simultaneous communication and the 
putative lack of hierarchy on the hypertexted internet. Similarly in criticism the cyborg is a 
favoured figure for postmodern, techno-inscribed subjectivity while hypertext often stands for 
postmodern semiosis. Broadly speaking, though, in spite of the overt celebration or, at least, a 
tolerance of a cultural politics of postmodern complexity and diversity, it is important to stress 
that logocentric metanarratives do not simply vanish. On the contrary, cultural narratives 
attached to new practices and artefacts are often simply new versions of old stories, even 
though they may appear to be freshly minted from a new technocultural economy.42 
Postmodernity and technoculture, in this way, talk a lot about gaining new freedoms and 
democracies within an atomised culture. However, as we shall see in some representative 
texts, hidden orders are present which are particularly attached to historical cultural 
metanarratives 
In the spirit of locating knowledges, it has become a critical commonplace for cultural 
critics writing on technoculture and technoscience to stress their position of speaking from 
outside scientific knowledge and training. With respect to this practice, it may be seen to be a 
move which secures the knowledge claim or as a celebratory fact (in accordance with the 
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belief that speaking from the margins often provides a better perspective on canons of 
knowledge). In response, many 'scientific' critics see this as an embarrassingly easy target for 
cultural critics' 'defamatory' claims against the canons of technoscience. Andrew Ross' 
Strange Weather is, in this way, dedicated to 'all of the science teachers I never had. It could 
only have been written without them' 43. If taken seriously, Ross' claim may seem a little unfair 
in suggesting that those who have training in the canons of science are so blinkered with 
modernist or other logocentric systems that they are unable to see outside its prescriptions 
and methods. However, as a more gentle rebuke toward the scientific establishment's 
anathema toward criticism coming from anywhere but from within its own ranks and, also, its 
fiercely guarded narrative forms and power, Ross' acknowledgment ironically prefigures the 
critical lashing his work would receive in the hands of, for instance, Gross and Levitt in Higher 
Superstition44• 
Even more dramatically, the much publicised attack on the journal Social Text by 
physicist Alan Sokal threw up all of the anxieties surrounding fraught claims of speaking rights 
and emphasised the position of privilege narratives of scientific knowledge inhabit, and their 
powerful system of philosophical guarantees which is so upset when it is exposed. Typical of 
a culture in thrall to the promises and authority of science, in the media coverage of the event, 
physicist Sokal was heralded as a brave sceptic who debunked the superstitions of the 
academic left and their poststructuralist mumbo jumbo of the kind Gross and Levitt also 
describe in their Higher Superstition. Hence, when cultural critics write on science, the 
accusation that they simply do not have the technical expertise to comment is seen as a 
perfectly valid invalidatory strategy. However, when scientists write on cultural criticism, their 
technical expertise is seen as an eminently suitable qualification, at least as far as the popular 
media coverage is concerned, for valid criticism. So from any perspective, the scientific claims 
to knowledge are ascendant, and the importance of position within the technocultural web is 
stressed.45 Reading this controversy as a conflict of located, juxtaposing cultural narratives, 
and their associated powers, makes evident the ironies which exist within what counts as 
knowledge. 
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The feminist critic Susan Borda writes extensively about the (re)investment of power 
in a supposedly flattened out, postmodern culture. In her article 'Material Girl', Bardo uses the 
cultural critic John Fiske's reading of power within postmodern culture as an example of the 
kind of postmodern reading which she is contesting. Borda quotes from Fiske, where he 
emphasises that: 'The subordinate may be disempowered, but they are not powerless. There 
is a power in resisting power, there is a power is maintaining one's social identity in opposition 
to that proposed by the dominant ideology, there is a power in asserting one's own subcultural 
values against dominant ones. There is, in short, a power in being different'. Bardo contends 
that this, as a misreading of power, is one which implies that 'all forces have become 
"resources"' and that this misreading is sustained by 'a very common postmodern 
misappropriation of Foucault'. This misappropriation of Foucault, according to Bardo, 
acknowledges that power is implicit in all kinds of social and cultural interactions, however, it 
also implies that power is 'in the possession of individuals or groups, [it is] something they 
"have"-a conception that Foucault was at great pains to criticize' 46 . In terms of 
technoculture, however, it is Fiske's kind of reading of postmodernity which is commonly 
celebrated and pushed by such diverse power groups as advertisers, consumers of hi-tech, 
corporations such as Microsoft, Netscape, and popular culture texts. Technologies become 
resources of self-expression and self-empowerment. 
In his Technologies of the Self Foucault elaborates four different social technologies 
which he characterises as the technologies of production, of sign systems, of power and of the 
self. The last two are of particularly interest here. Foucault writes: 'Technologies of power, 
which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends of domination, 
and objectivizing of the subject' and, secondly, the technologies of the self, which Fiske might 
see as crucial, 'permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies, thoughts, conduct and ways of being, so as 
to tran sf arm themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality.'47 Like the concept of the technology of gender, the technologies of 
power seem really to be technologies of domination, regulation and control. It seems typical of 
Foucault to stress the extent of control rather than the potential for freedom and so even the 
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imagined state of happiness is set within a context of permission rather than of possibility. 
Certainly, it is clear within his work that power is not in the possession of any individuals, or 
even organisations but rather is immanent in their functioning. Although Foucault's concept of 
technologies is an expanded sense, as Mark Jenkins rightly points out 'his language indicates 
a conception remaining firmly within a scene in which machines dominate bodies'.48 
Figuration, as Foucault and others describe it, offers a way of talking about the 
articulation of the subject through technologies or other systems of power. At a most basic 
level, what distinguishes figuration from theories of subjectivity is the way figuration stresses 
the multiplicity of choices available to identity formation and the blending of the imaginary with 
the material. However figuration is not a theory of ontology which is specifically oppositional or 
distinguishable to subjectivity. In fact, some theories and narratives of subjectivity could be 
said to provide various figurations for identity. In ModesLWitness Haraway describes 
figurations as: 
performative images that can be inhabited. Verbal or visual, figurations can be 
condensed maps of contestable worlds. All language, including mathematics, is 
figurative, that is, made of tropes, constituted by bumps that make us swerve from 
literal-mindedness. I emphasise figuration to make explicit and inescapable the tropic 
quality of all material-semiotic processes, especially in technoscience .... The chip, 
seed, or gene is simultaneously literal and figurative. We inhabit and are inhabited by 
such figures that map universes of knowledge, practice and power.49 
Hence the 'process of ontology' (as I referred to figuration earlier) is performative, yet 
also real and imaginary, fictive and material, science fictional and quotidian. Broad markers 
such as gender, age, race, ethnicity and a whole host of other complex interwoven markers, 
technocultural or otherwise, code us just as we use these codes for our figuration. Because 
we inhabit figurations, we can never be outside them (that would be like trying to get to some 
'real' outside representation). The cultural map is all around, interpolating us into its symbolic 
and material systems. From theories of subjectivity, figuration works potently through 
language and the multitude of other symbolic systems; and, in this sense, it is equally caught 
up in the dramas of Oedipus and identity formation. However, in distinction to the 
psychoanalytic subject, there is no Aha-erlebnis for figurations, or shock of alienation and 
identity formation after the gaze travels through the mirror. This is because figuration is 
multiple and recursive. 
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While stressing choice to the individual on the one hand, on the other, figuration also 
draws attention to the fact that the world is a structured place where access to certain 
technocultural figurations is utterly denied to some, yet accessible to and encouraged in 
others. The unequally structured relations within technoculture ensure that some figurations 
are much more powerful than others. Building on Foucault's concept of biopower as the 
conglomerate of institutionalised practices of regulating and producing 'docile' bodies, 
Haraway calls these structured relations technobiopower. Just as Foucault suggests that 
biopower produces and regulates the privileged figures of the Malthusian couple, the 
masturbating child, the hysterical woman and the homosexual pervert, 50 in her most recent 
book Haraway suggests a host of privileged figures that inhabit the realms of technoscience. 
The major figures which she uses to shape her critique of technoscience are the 
Modest_Witness, the FemaleMan© and the OncoMouse™. But these figures are always held 
in tension with their implicit relation to Man™- the figure of Man 'enterprised up' 51 . The 
theoretical concerns that these figures embody, are spawned from her most famous figuration 
for complex technologically-implicated identity, the cyborg. 
Since 'A Manifesto For Cyborgs' appeared in the Socialist Review in 1985, both the 
figure of the cyborg and the manifesto itself have become of central concern to academic 
debate on technology, identity, and feminism. With Haraway's seemingly user-friendly concept 
of the cyborg-which is, at the most basic level, a hybrid of animal and machine-it was now 
possible to talk about a new kind of figuration for complex, technoculturally-inscribed identity. 
This cyborg is knowingly implicated in its technological embodiment and, with its dynamic of 
blurred and flexible identities, attempts to deconstruct the politics and power of hegemonic 
modernist identity within technoculture. This work is a manifesto and, as such, it clearly 
contains a utopian impulse grounded in Haraway's 'blasphemous faith' of socialist feminism. 
While this utopian impulse urges for pleasures in the confusions of traditional boundaries-of 
animal, machine, nature, culture-the Manifesto is nevertheless deeply committed to an 
awareness of the histories and practices of oppression that inform the genesis of a cyborg 
subject in the late twentieth century. In contrast to many of its cyborgian forebears and 
contemporaries (military, fictional, filmic), this passionate cyborg subject must knowingly 
- 39 -
acknowledge its lineage with a multitude of things, such as the communications technologies 
of World War Two, the advances in bio-research which were made in concentration camps 
and which continue in technoscientific laboratories, Cold War nuclear technologies, icons of 
hard muscled masculine and military power: in short, this cyborg can never forget its intimate 
fusion with technologies and histories of devastation and oppression. 
As Haraway argues in the 'Cyborg Manifesto,' the history of the cyborg in military 
technology is only one strand of its stories; or, as she describes it, this provides only a single 
vantage point: 
From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on 
the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in 
the name of defence, about the final appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist 
orgy of war. From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and 
bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and 
machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The 
political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both 
dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. Single vision 
produces worse illusions than double vision or many-headed monsters. Cyborg unities 
are monstrous and illegitimate; in our present political circumstances, we could hardly 
hope for more potent myths for resistanc.e and recoupling. 52 
In spite of these histories, however, Haraway's emblematic cyborg remains hopeful 
and passionate. Eschewing a politic of ambivalence, the cyborg is passionate precisely 
because feeling in embodiment, or passion, is intrinsic to its politics of situating knowledges. 
Locating knowledges from the place of a mediated body is also how the cyborg overcomes 
the paradox central to its ontology. On the one hand, the cyborg represents multiple fusions 
which disrupt the stable modernist position as we have come to know it through our Cartesian 
inheritance of knowledge. Yet, on the other, through inescapably making explicit the tension of 
'holding incompatible things together because all are necessary and true' 53 and the 
embodiment of its position within competing technological and cultural discourses, the cyborg 
potentially offers 'partial perspective and objective vision'. 
Haraway's language is heavy with modifiers such as 'scary', 'troubling', 'monstrous', 
'tricksterish', 'polluted', 'illegitimate', 'blasphemous', and 'dirty'. This places her figures at the 
margins of culture and society and does not try to recuperate the unity of the modernist 
subject in the service of technological progress or the machine as avatar. These ubiquitous 
monsterish modifiers and the dreamy-inspired tone her writing sometimes takes also 
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expresses the elusiveness of rewriting tropes and figurations, of retelling stories, and finding 
new ways of expressing things from the belly of the technoscientific monster. In this way, 
being a cyborg is being committed to subjectivity, to embodiment, to perspective, while also 
being connected to, or interpolated into, an ironic system. 
Haraway's cyborg figuration as I have been describing it here is obviously a 
celebrated ideal: an imaginative utopian figure of the cyborg, who speaks a heteroglossia, 
lives in a heterotopia and is committed to embodiment and situating knowledges, can access, 
read and re-write the cryptography of the surrounding and internal technoculture. This cyborg 
offers the possibility, of learning 'from our fusions with animals and machines, how not to be 
Man, the embodiment of Western logos'54 
However, this celebratory ideal is problematised by the fact that machines are most 
often man-made artefacts. Cyborgs are often narrativised as a part of phallocentric desire to 
create and evolve without the 'interference' of women's bodies. A quick browse into the 
cyberneticists' Clynes and Kline's research into cyborgs in the early 1960's is deeply revealing 
of this desire.55 Unfortunately, it is difficult to recode highly coded figurations; it is a long 
process and so many military and sexist systems infuse the cyborg with meaning so radically 
different from Haraway's celebratory ideal. Rather than looking for an essential, premodern, 
earthy femaleness, 'the Cyborg Manifesto' is an inspired cry for engagement in technoculture 
and a hope for celebration. The majority of texts I examine in the following chapters confirm 
the difficulty of recoding this figure: popular cyborg representations hardly offer promising and 
liberating figurations for complex, contingent and nuanced technocultural identity. However, 
where these figurations are useful is in their embodiment of cultural narratives about the body, 
the self, the relationship of Man to Woman, and so forth. In short, of the anxieties and desires 
surrounding technological change. 
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Chapter Three: Anxiety and Nostalgia in the Future: Gatta ca and Man™ 
As Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline proclaimed in a paper at a Space Flight 
Symposium in 1960: 'Space travel challenges mankind not only technologically but also 
spiritually, in that it invites man to take an active part in his own biological evolution. Scientific 
advances of the future may thus be utilized to permit man's existence in environments which 
differ radically from those provided by nature as we know it'. 56 As Clynes and Kline were the 
'designers' of the first cybernetic organism, their interest in improving upon Man for stres sf ul 
space flight missions was evident.57 It is interesting that they talk about 'challenging mankind' 
both technologically and spiritually. Firstly, space flight enhances Man's power over nature, in 
the way Bac6n talks about it, but, additionally, Man is able to take 'an active part in his own 
biological evolution', which also provides a challenge to him. These combined concepts; 
simultaneously challenging and strengthening Man; of technology and spirituality; of evolution 
and scientific advances of the future, form the major themes of this chapter. At the heart of 
this discussion are the various uses of the cultural narrative of the technological sublime. I will 
continue the theme of the cultural perceptions of space travel in the American imaginary and 
the degree to which it is underwritten by an adherence to the sublime. 
In Andrew Niccol's Gattaca (1988) there is the utopian sense that through massive 
sublime technologies Man can transcend the limits of his Nature through 'unnatural' genetic 
technologies, which allow him 'to take an active part in his own biological evolution'. However, 
these technologies also challenge man and his social ordering. Finding a resolution for this 
paradox, is a central concern in Gattaca. This resolution lies in creating a gap between the 
massive technology of the sublime, and burgeoning genetic techniques that challenge the 
humanist narrative of Man. 
As David E. Nye comments in American Technological Sublime58, the Space Race of 
the 1960's provided some of the most potent technologically sublime images of this century. 
Describing Norman Mailer's famous coverage of the Apollo XI mission, he writes: 'Mailer 
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noted that the vessel that was to carry men to the moon was surrounded with the aura of 
religion, and that it seemed a sacred object .... here was the ultimate machine of the twentieth 
century taking on the trappings of a shrine, with its pilgrims, its mysteries, and its terrible, 
controlled violence.' 59 As this passage indicates, the potential for overwhelmed awe, desire, 
fear and transcendence that massive technological spectacles can invoke is comparable to a 
religious epiphany. Hence, Norman Mailer's memorable and inadvertent repetition of 'Oh, my 
God! Oh, my God! Oh, my God! Oh, my God' broadcast at the moment of the Apollo XI 
blastoff is in keeping with the spectacle of this technological sublime. As the rocket blasted up 
in a ball of fire the meaningfulness of the spectacle and the event as originally experienced by 
the one million people who gathered to see it, the many million more who saw it transmitted 
on television, and then, much later, generations like my own who would hear of it through its 
huge folklore, read of it in books chronicling 'great events' of the twentieth century, and see it 
as a symbol rebroadcast and used almost to banality on television, was already described in 
and circumscribed by, narratives of religion, humanism and the sublime. 
For America, the meaningfulness of the spectacle derived from solid foundations in 
that nation's imaginary. In the tradition of what Nye calls the American Technological 
Sublime,60 the iconography of such things as huge railways conquering vast distance with the 
new thrill of speed, the spectacle of manufacturing plants capable of an exponential increase 
in production coupled with later reorganisations of industrial labour that so-called Taylorism or 
Scientific Management ushered in, towering bridges, skyscrapers, and other huge 
architectural artefacts of massive nineteenth century American expansionary capitalism, 
provided scenes of brute machine force which filled the cultural imagination. This came to be 
seen, as Leo Marx describes it in The Machine in the Garden 'as the fulcrum of national 
power'.61 Ranging from the perverse beauty, power and horrifying image of the atomic bomb's 
mushroom cloud to the quiet beauty and shocking strangeness of bluey-green planet Earth 
viewed from outer space, these exalted, sublimely technological spectacles, seem implicitly 
sanctioned by a divine force. The intensity of the experience of the sublime is such that 
technologies are tran sf ormed from materialised embodiments of reason to portals to a realm 
of potentially infinite power and possibilities. The critic Jonathan Bordo describes this 
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paradox: 'the sublime arises not from what reason has excluded and suppressed, but from the 
products of reason itself.62 Through this process, the sublime technological spectacle is 
shifted to a 'higher' plane both overwhelming to reason but an outcome of reason. The implicit 
struggle between emotional and rational perception plays itself out in the descriptions of 
technological spectacles. 
Our historical understanding of the sublime is partly owed to the English philosopher 
Edmund Burke who in Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful (1757) made an important distinction between the merely beautiful and the sublime. 
The experience of the sublime, according to Burke, always involves terror, obscurity, solitude, 
power, darkness, and vastness: 'whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and 
danger ... or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a way analogous to terror, is a 
source of the sublime; that is productive of the strongest emotion that the mind is capable of 
feeling'.63 These qualities are clearly inherited from religious experience. The result for many 
narratives of sublime technologies is a sense of euphoria that infects the machines with 
mystical qualities held in tension with the symptoms of angst that accompany technological 
change and are indicative of a certain fear of overreaching 'natural' limits. 
The American Military-Industrial Complex also has a special interest in maintaining its 
historically-derived technological sublime through the associated ideas of the perfect, fail-safe, 
all-powerful machine, coloniser of the enemy and of outer space. These artefacts are products 
of rationality yet their representations are of a realm where artefacts, narratives and fantasy 
blend and fuse. 64 As Vincent Mosco points out: 'military aspirations and computer mythology 
have been symbiotically sustained, permeating the entire political culture with a systems 
discourse of omnipotence'.65 Further, in terms of the pragmatics of military power, these 
narratives are crucial to the maintenance of perceived military strength: this is also called 
deterrence. The continuation of a large military budget depends on military power being 
considered necessary to the public. The hugely embarrassing, failed Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), or 'Star Wars', as it became universally known, filled the technological 
imagination during the 1980's and epitomises both the fantasy of technological omnipotence 
and the discourses of the sublime. 
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Star Wars was a space-based defence of America from enemy ICBM's using X-ray 
lasers, particle beams, and other directed-energy weapons, which, in its narrative 
representations, could easily have fallen from the pages of a science fiction novel. Politically, 
however, it was as much based on President Reagan's pressing need to continue a nuclear 
freeze during the height of the Cold War, a strong faith that, with enough research and 
funding, these technologies could be developed, and an imaginative adherence to a 
Hollywood-supported American technological sublime. 
Reagan's expensive and fantastic Star Wars dream was launched in 1983 with the 
famous to 'protect our people, not just avenge them' speech which was almost directly uplifted 
from Alfred Hitchcock's 1980 film Torn Curtain. It was appropriate to a realm where 
imagination and reality are fused. Complexities (and absurdities) of the Cold War aside, a 
clear factor in legitimating the programme as a massive spending priority was the mystique of 
computer technologies that increasingly came to dominate the cultural imagination of the West 
during the 1980's; the decade when computers suddenly proliferated and entered many 
homes and most workplaces. In accordance with this new societal tran sf ormation, the culture 
industry as a whole echoed Cold War politics. It became populated with science fiction, 
technology-based plots, and was often strongly based around the battles of good Americans 
against evil empires. The very style of Reagan's presidency, as a former Hollywood hero 
himself, was strongly characterised by these kinds of cultural narratives and dreams of 
idealised solutions. For this reason, the science fictional mysticism of Lucas' American-
accented battle up in the stars is as good a resource as any for 'inspirational' defence policy 
as it fused the American Technological Sublime, and Hollywood simple solutions for a 
complex world with material policy. Coupled with the very real fear of nuclear attack, the 
strength of the institutionalised sublime fantasy was such that Star Wars eventually gained 
widespread public support for a few years at least. This was in spite of it being the largest 
spending programme ever proposed by any government at a time when the US had a 
massive government deficit, and a political commitment to reducing the budget with no further 
taxes. In the later context of both the Challenger and the Chernobyl disasters, the basic 
hardware required to make the Star Wars defence shield functional was emphasised as 
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inherently untrustworthy. Even this, though, paradoxically served to confirm the SOi's place in 
the sublime, where the 'dark promises of unimaginable violence'66, were tragically fulfilled. 
Eventually, when the programme was decommissioned, the phrase 'technological hubris' was 
often used to describe its failure as if to try to achieve the sublime necessarily invoked divine 
punishment. In this way, even if in relation to technologies the sublime is thoroughly 
secularised, it still adheres to its religious origins. What is more interesting about this instance 
of the technological sublime though, is its illustration of how the desire for power yet 
transcendence, fear yet desire, can play itself out through technologies and cloud lucid 
judgment about their usefulness. 
The dramatised conflict between these cultural narratives of the future and their 
associated practices and institutional structures brings about this crisis in humanist identity 
which Gattaca portrays. However, instead of resolving this conflict with a new and appropriate 
figuration for complex identity within this technocultural environment, Gattaca instead prefers 
to reinstate an essentialised, individualist, humanist identity set within a narrative resolution 
which is as reactionary as it is unimaginative. 
Science fiction cinema has an established tradition of exploring hi-tech dystopian 
representations of an imaginary future. From Metropolis, to Blade Runner to Gattaca, usually 
these dystopian futures are clear extrapolations of contemporary social, cultural and scientific 
concerns which strongly resonate with the anxieties of their historically-specific moment of 
production. Because they are so entrenched in their present, the futures they represent 
quickly look dated; their visions of tomorrow made absurd, unfashionable, naive or simply 
inconceivable through the historical lens of today and the changed practices of social and 
machine technologies. Writing in the early 1990's on the then favoured hi-tech "period look" of 
the future, Andrew Ross critiques, on a political level, the wretched 'survivalist' future 
representations of cyberpunk. Ross.67 argues that, while the dystopian cyberpunk future is 
replete with extreme historical anxieties, its absence of any hopeful pleasures or suggestions 
for alternatives, in effect, leaves the predominant writing of progressive social futures to 
corporate and military interests. However, there are many examples of sf imagining 
progressive social futures such as, for example, the very succes sf ul feminist sf series from 
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the Women's Press which published many highly political novels dealing with future 
representations. Entangled coporate and military interests certainly guide the technocultural 
narrative economy in very large part. Cyberpunk, which I discuss further in chapter five, can 
also be seen as reactive to these dominant interests rather than simply replicating or 
representing them. However, looking at "period looks" and "period concerns" is a useful way 
into the dominant narratives of the recent film Gatacca. 
In terms of negotiating and remaking this accreted economy of technocultural stories, 
writer and director Andrew Niccol's recent film Gattaca provides a particularly stylish example. 
To create its strongly dystopian critique of technoscience, the future in Gattaca is created out 
of a number of twentieth century progressive-and failed-social impulses of the past. The 
favoured period look of the cyberpunk world, a world filled with filthy trashed machines 
coexisting with wrecked and cynical people who barely survive by their wits alone, gives way 
in Gattaca to a bright, clean, efficient and highly-regulated authoritarian future. While this 
highly stylised look-characterised by the ultra-clean modern lines of the 'International Style' 
in architecture and design-indexes a host of concerns and impulses from the 1960's Space 
Age, to the transcendence and optimism of the American technological sublime and the 
associated fears of technological determinism; these period concerns played out in Gattaca 
are overlaid with 1990's anxieties about genetic engineering and its tangled historical 
association with eugenics and social control. So even though the "period look" of the film 
indexes utopian impulses, from our historical perspectives and through the ideological filter of 
the film's representations, it is amply clear from the outset that these utopian impulses are to 
be read as prefiguring dangerously menacing possibilities. The clean modern lines of the 
Gattaca world, while invoking a seductive nostalgia for the older, more optimistic period future, 
serve to ironically underscore the anxieties of our age which inexorably tran sf orm this 
hygienic future representation into a deeply dystopian vision. 
Gattaca is characterised by both an anxiety and nostalgia toward the technological 
sublime. Although set in an imaginary future, the film achieves its sense of nostalgia by 
indexing a host of twentieth century utopian and sublime impulses. Consequently, Gattaca 
presents the imagined future of the 'now', through the veil of yesterday's future. This 
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recognition of the differing ideologies of different times is also the mode of perception of which 
Cseray-Ronay speaks when he says, as I elaborated earlier, that sf is premised on a pair of 
gaps. Narratives of the sublime are inherently conservative because of their historical use of 
securing the location and ascendancy of humanist Man. However, in Gattaca the impulse 
towards a sublime world has paradoxically resulted in challenging this figure. However, 
instead of resolving this conflict with a new and appropriate figuration for complex identity 
within this technocultural environment, Gattaca prefers instead to reinstate an essentialised, 
individualist, humanist identity set within a narrative resolution which is as conservative as it is 
ultimately unimaginative. By making a clear distinction between good technologies and bad 
technologies the film allows the figure of Man to survive, or at least to escape. The dramatised 
conflict between these two cultural narratives and their associated practices and institutional 
structures brings about this crisis in humanist identity which Gattaca portrays. 
In this 'not-so-distant-future', institutionalised technoscientific practices support an 
authoritarian power regime based on genetic identity. Here, genetic information provides the 
criteria for demographic divisions with the genetically high scoring, or 'valids', able to gain 
access to the most elite professions while the low scoring, or 'in-valids', are destined to 
boring, menial jobs. Consequently, the genetic body is politicised as a microcosmic 
representation of the wider social structure. In terms of this relationship, the film suggests, the 
more technoscience sees genetic 'perfection' as a goal, the more this translates over to a 
technofascist requirement for increasing demographic perfection and regulation. For 
individuals in this world, the instrumentalisation of life begins with their placement in the 
genetic, and, by extension, social taxonomy before birth when their DNA configuration is 
planned in the petrie dish according to the 'best possible matches' available from their 
parents. With the bright, clean and thoroughly ubiquitous technologies of measurement in 
Gattaca, the child's identity may be read straight from the genes and tabulated according to 
such things as the risk of disease, IQ, and life expectancy, but also eye colour, hair colour, 
height, sex, and so on. The cultural contingency of the concept of 'the best possible matches' 
and its ability to be measured is not discussed in the film in terms of its potentially racist, 
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sexist or homophobic politics, rather, I will argue in just a moment, it is dealt with in terms of 
the potential erosion of the sovereign, humanist subject. 
In Gattaca's genetic and, hence, demographic stakes, Vincent Freeman is not so 
fortunate, nor so free as his name suggests. His mother had decided, as she puts it, to 'put 
her faith in God's hands rather than the local geneticist' and, in a sequence of biographical 
scenes, she and Vincent's father are shown coupling in the way of romantic American 
Hollywood; in the back of a retro-futuristic Studebaker Avanti, parked by the sea, to the tempo 
of a resonantly symbolic, dangling crucifix. The technology of the big American car, the film 
suggests, in the glow of this nostalgic biographical sequence, is technology being used 
appropriately, humanly, in a time when things were still possible for the future. The film 
contrasts these dreamy nostalgic images to the oppressive future of Gattaca where Vincent is 
contemptuously labelled a 'Faith birth,' his genetic forecast bleakly warning of a potential early 
death, a likelihood of certain hereditary diseases, and ranking him an in-valid. Disregarding 
his potential genetic disadvantages, though, Vincent dreams of becoming a stellar navigator; a 
career that is entirely out of his grasp according to his genetic scorecard. His father, putting 
voice to the oppressive social structure, makes it painfully clear to him that the 'only way 
[Vincent] would ever get inside of a space station were if [he was) cleaning it'. Given the 
way the film has already at this point set up its generic, and, hence, narrative, allegiances, it is 
not surprising, then, that Vincent's genetic quotient is shown to be entirely misleading of his 
potential: after all, we are told, 'there is no gene for ambition,' nor for Fate. Played by the all-
American hunk Ethan Hawke (whose athletic good looks certainly belie no obvious genetic 
disadvantage), Vincent nevertheless harbours his dream and eventually resorts to an 
elaborate deception of genetic identity. Enlisting the help of a ghoulish broker of identities,68 
Vincent Freeman is matched with Jerome Eugene Morrow whose DNA, in keeping with the 
imaginary possibilities of his name's reference to 'eugenics tomorrow,' represents the 
apotheosis of genetic perfection. Eugene (as he becomes known) is, in spite of this, highly 
self-destructive. A failed suicide attempt has left him crippled and wheelchair-bound, and 
places him as a symbol of the impossibility of reading identity straight from the genes and the 
huge expectations which are concomitant with even trying to do so. Just as the film's 
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perspective lovingly traces over the smooth clean lines of Frank Lloyd Wright's Marin County 
Center, and other sublime and massive architectural spectacles, these sights are also implicit, 
by way of contrast, in Eugene's crushed and broken body and the fascism of such a dream of 
hygienic perfection. Similarly, the homogeneity and obedience of the immaculate Armani-
suited, bryl-creamed valids at the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation serve to emphasis that here 
'Dirt has no place to hide'. 69 Nor do traces of genetic 'imperfection'. So in order to erase all 
traces of his 'in-valid' self in the 'valid' world, Vincent scrubs his body shiny clean every day to 
minimise the chance of stray skin cells compromising his identity as Jerome Morrow. To effect 
this daily deception, Vincent must strap on a bladder of Eugene's 'valid' urine and a fingertip 
prosthesis containing 'valid' blood for the daily substance tests while scattering Eugene's skin 
cells and stray hairs about his workstation. In this world, the eugenic man's genetically 
ordered substances are clean, while Vincent's are dirty. Abject body substances, it is 
emphasised, must be policed by Vincent to avoid the tyranny of genetic prejudice. The abject, 
as Julia Kristeva has described it, is what separates subject from object; hence, the feeling of 
horror implicit in contact with the abject is a result of its in-between ontological status. 70 
Making the abject clean is, then, Vincent's work. In keeping with the ideological critique the 
film levels at this social ordering, Eugene is shown to be the one with the problem with bodily 
and social borders, with the abject, in other words. Lacking Vincent's ordered discipline, 
Eugene smokes, swears, drinks and then throws up. As someone for whom technologies are 
so intimate, he has a contaminated body: too perfectly hygienic and unnatural, too resonant of 
vampire-like fusions. He is also contemptuous of the social system in a way which Vincent is 
not, yet happily plays his strong genetic cards without qualms when it serves his needs. In this 
way, Eugene is both political and self-serving whereas Vincent is entirely self-serving and 
apolitical, if that is how we may interpret Vincent's single-minded individualist pursuit of 
escape into the stars. 
With Vincent's rocket launch only a week away, a murder at the Gattaca space 
station tightens security which eventually forces Vincent into a showdown with his long-lost 
genetically superior brother Anton who is, appropriately, chief police investigator. The explicit 
point of the film is not hard to miss with its constant reiterations: while Eugene, the eugenic 
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man, and Anton, Vincent's superior brother, were born with every genetic advantage for 
success in this world, they are a failure of genetics to measure everything which makes up an 
individual's life. 
In relation to the Human Genome Project, as my analysis in chapter one shows, the 
gene provides a map of competing political interests, not at all as a scientifically-neutral 
descriptor of human biological makeup. Drawing on Foucault's concept of biopower and the 
work of the feminist philosopher of science Sarah Franklin, Donna Haraway describes the 
tension between Nature and the gene: The instrumentalization of life proceeds by means of 
cultural practices-socio-political, epistemological and technical .... "Life," materialized as 
information and signified by the gene, displaces "Nature," preeminently embodied in and 
signified in old-fashioned organisms. From the point of view of the gene, a self-replicating 
autogenerator, "the whole is not the sum of its parts, [but] the parts summarize the whole'" 71 
Genes are small things we cannot see without the mediation of technologies. Seeing, 
then, has been displaced in this world from the privileged motif of the humanist subject by 
what the film suggests is a form of blindness. In Gattaca the motif of sight is extensively used 
as a means of expressing the ideological critique the film levels at blindness. For instance, 
myopia is one of the clearest indications that someone is a 'Faith birth' or a 'God child', as the 
naturally conceived are known. Vincent must wear coloured contact lenses to see at all and 
look like Jerome, and when he becomes a suspect in the murder enquiry, it is because one of 
his own eyelashes was found near the crime scene. Amazingly, even when photos of himself 
as a suspect are displayed everywhere, no one recognizes him as Vincent because genetic 
identity is the only thing they can 'see', and so all they can 'see' is Jerome, they are blind to 
his 'real' identity. Even as the film audience, we are not allowed to 'see' much outside the 
clean places where the privileged valids lead their lives. In only one brief scene are we 
allowed a glimpse of the average invalid's life, where they are being rounded up and checked 
for their genetic identity; with the spotlights, loudspeakers, and smart uniforms of the identity 
police contrasting so starkly to their shabby coats, their fearfulness and misery. This is the 
underclass who suffer more than Vincent and who he will leave behind after he has escaped 
to the stars. 
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Vincent's perspective clearly does not contain much of the abject underclass, and the 
film itself turns a blind eye toward this aspect of life, apart from in this aberrant scene. Instead, 
our gaze is directed, along with Vincent's, at the rockets which shoot off daily through the 
stratosphere to the stars. These scenes, with Vincent's hopeful face tracking the rockets' 
progress, invoke something of the upturned faces of the crowd, bathed in light, who gathered 
to watch launches like the Apollo XI mission. The sublime spectacle of rockets signifies 
exploration into the unknown, the valiant and rightful place of technology, going to new 
frontiers, for the exaltation and betterment of people. These are technologies which are 
outside the self and body. In contrast, technologies so close under the skin which cruelly 
measure and challenge identity are an undoing of 'God's handiwork,' as the film's epigraph 
suggests72 . This is the crucial dichotomy between 'good' technologies and 'bad' technologies 
which, finally, Gattaca creates in order to resolve the sublime with a fearful erosion of the 
stable subject Man. 
This move resolves the disjunction between contemporary anxiety stemming from 
fears of genetic determinism and nostalgia for a mythical time when the future was a sublimely 
bright place. This also opens up a space into which the sovereign humanist subject may be 
inserted. While Gattaca explicitly dramatises Vincent's movement towards freedom and 
escape, it achieves this by an ideological movement towards an individualistic, competitive, 
Darwinian hierarchical notion of 'natural' Man. Demonstrating this ideology, the two brothers 
swim out in the ocean, racing one another dangerously far from the shore and invoking a 
sense of primeval competition for natural selection which, as the film suggests, is the basis for 
our humanist individuality. Of course, Vincent wins this race. After all, he was conceived by 
the sea and has struggled all his life: all of the film's dominant motifs and generic allegiances 
set up the reinstatement of this narrative. Anton's complacent superiority epitomises, 
according to this logic, the arrogance of any other belief. Only individual achievement ensures 
success in the great race of life which this film represents. 
Just as Haraway suggests that' "Life," materialized as information and signified by 
the gene, displaces "Nature," preeminently embodied in and signified by old-fashioned 
organisms' so Gattaca performs the opposite move of reinstating "Nature" and the natural 
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body as the correct metonym for social systems. Although beautifully crafted, visually stylish, 
and suspenseful, as a filmic text Gattaca does not really provide a thick or very provocative 
analysis of its issues but rather iterates and reiterates this conservative moral message in 
every scene. Gattaca negotiates the matrix of relations between ontology, technologically-
mediated bioethics, and social organisation through the tension between technological utopian 
impulses and 1990's anxiety about genetics; what we have come to call in highly charged 
terms, social or genetic engineering. Early in the film we are told that this is a society where 
'discrimination is down to a science'. What is at stake in this film is 'whose science?' and 'what 
science?' In the world of Gattaca, as elsewhere, the science that counts is that of those who 
have a stake in maintaining the genetically-defined hegemonic order. However, constantly in 
epistemic battle with this science is the recurrent motifs of natural selection, competition, and 
humanism: these, the film seems to suggest implicitly, are the 'right' sciences, or even, the 
right faith. 
So just as 'Space travel challenges mankind not only technologically but also 
spiritually' Gattaca, illustrates what kinds of challenges are acceptable and the limits of their 
acceptability. Whereas space flight and other such technologies which extend man's power 
over the world are acceptable, technologies so close under the skin and too implicit in 
constructing Man, are clearly unacceptable. In the next chapter I will continue with the theme 
of the technological challenges posed to Man and show other ways in which this crisis is 
resolved 
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Chapter Four: Maria's Sisters: Figurations of Hi-Tech Women and Stabilising the Crisis 
of Man 
Maria the robot from Fritz Lang's Metropolis (1926) offers a potent figure of fear of 
machines and fear of femininity. She is created out of perverse machine-love, masculine 
desire and is used for destruction. Her body is fleshy, erotic and satanic and yet covers a 
gleaming metal carapace revealed in her destruction on a bonfire. In contrast, the human 
Maria, in whose image the robot Maria is made, is like an agent of God; an angel whose 
purity, chastity and demureness are unquestionable. These two female figures are set within 
the imaginary dystopia of the cult film Metropolis famous for its critique of an imagined 
juggernaut of technological progress in the future. What is of particular interest here is that 
even though the film explicitly enacts a technological crisis posed to the figure of stable, 
unified, humanist Man, the representation and use of the two Marias is by far the strongest 
preoccupation of the representations and narrative structure of the film. I will discuss this 
seeming paradix in terms of Gayatri Spivak's contention that female representations are 
instruments of masculine self-assertion. 73 
Ridley Scott's Blade Runner (1984), tran sf orms these figures of Maria into Pris, 
Zhora and Rachael who are replicants, or biological copies, of human beings. While Pris and 
Zhora are highly sexualised, dangerous, with eyes lit by an inhuman light as are the robot 
Maria's, Rachael is contained and feminine, distant and aloof, and, above all, vulnerable. 
Maria's double identity in Metropolis encompasses cultural dualisms of real/fake, good/evil, 
virgin/whore, angel/devil, and so on, in Blade Runner, she splits into three female parts each 
of which can be seen as metonyms of Maria. 
In this chapter I discuss the representation and structural function of these female 
figurations and argue that they are implicit in the conservative recuperation of the figure of 
Man. Far from learning 'from animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of 
western logos,' as Haraway puts it, fusion with machines in Metropolis results in personal and 
social contaminations that need to be exorcised. This is the symbolism of Maria's punishment 
- 54 -
when she is burnt down to her skeleton of inert metal and also the need for Christian narrative 
resolutions, as shall be discussed. 
In her excellent Technologies of the Gendered Body, Anne Balsamo, maintains that 
Woman, and in particular, cyborg Woman, is a good site for examining social forces and 
figurations as the 'technological imagination has imbued cyborgs with ancient anxieties about 
human difference'. From this site, she continues, 'we can witness the struggle between 
systems of social order'74 . Maria and her hi-tech sisters, then, are bodies in social struggle. 
Metropolis is famous for its sublime city as technology. Lang creates a technological 
spectacle of city life where the city structure is offered as a metaphor for deep and unjust 
social stratification which is created and maintained through the medium of machines. The city 
is hence a technology of oppression. If the film represents the tyranny of the ruling classes 
over the workers, then, the worst part of this, the film seems to suggest, is the dehumanisation 
of the labour force through mechanisms of social oppression. 'Dehumanising', according to 
Lang's representation here is about treating humans as machines, of not making a proper 
distinction between humans and technologies. 75 Furthermore, the film's representation of all 
levels of the city contains a built in critique. I will return to this notion of the 'proper distinction' 
shortly. 
The difference between a good and an evil woman is a central fascination in the film 
and is represented through the dichotomy between the real Maria and the false robotic Maria. 
In the spirit of both Frankenstein and Pygmalion, the false Maria is a creation of Rotgang, a 
'mad wizard' who tries to create his lost love, Hel. There is a very clear visual differentiation 
between the real and the false Maria which is crucial to the maintenance of the proper 
distinction between machines and humans, subjects and objects, and its extant social order. 
In keeping with her Virgin Mary iconography, the real Maria is gentle, demure, and modest, 
her gestures and body movements are slow and contained and she is lit with an angelic white 
light. The false Maria, in stark contrast, is constantly frenetic and passionate, draws attention 
to her body, and to her gyrating hips, in particular, as an awareness of her own sexuality 
coded as evil. Her eyes are lit with an artificial light and she performs highly erotic, and yet, 
satanic dances which mesmerise and provoke the leisure classes of men to such a degree 
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that they fight one another in an effort to touch her. The film seems to suggest that feminine 
power is such that it can provoke violence in otherwise civilised men. Her power is also 
technological and so their desire for her is a perverse machine desire. Technologies are able 
to trick people into desiring bad things. When Maria the robot is finally destroyed, she writhes 
and laughs wildly in a satanic, orgasmic ecstasy before being burnt off to her skeleton of inert 
metal. After the purging and cleansing of fire and water, the master of the city, Joh Frederson, 
is awakened to the evil of his city. Maria encourages Frederson to link the 'hands' of the 
workers and the 'mind' of the Master with his 'heart', thus restoring order through this holy 
tripartite configuration and reinforcing the need for a proper distinction between humans and 
technology. 
Through the false Maria, Metropolis shows that women's power is bodily, erotic, and 
evil and that it is also a power which much be contained and erased as much as possible. The 
power of the woman is not real power though; rather it is an ability to elicit sexual desire from 
men and manipulate this desire. Women who use their bodies in this way are 'temptresses' 
and need to be punished, the film suggests, as men cannot resist women's bodies. Rotgang, 
Maria's creator, states: 'I have lost control of the robot and the inevitable consequences 
frighten me.' The inevitable consequences are well known from Shelley's Frankenstein where 
machine-desire and female-desire are shown to be dangerous, even deadly. As Andreas 
Huyssen explains, the historical association of robots with woman can be explained in 
psychoanalytic terms as a fear of the feminine: 
Historically ... we can conclude that as soon as the machine came to be perceived as a 
demonic, inexplicable threat and as harbinger of chaos and destruction ... writers began 
to imagine the Maschinenmensch as woman. There are grounds to suspect that we are 
facing here a complex process of projection and displacement. The fears and perpetual 
anxieties emanating from ever more powerful machines are recast and reconstructed in 
terms of the male fear of female sexuality, reflecting in the Freudian account, the male's 
castration anxiety. 76 
In keeping with the anxieties of this Freudian account, the real Maria is made less real 
which decodes some of her feminine dangerousness. But, in some scenes, she is made so 
ethereal, so self-effacing that she seems not really to exist. She has an angelic lightness 
about her which is strengthened by the strong white light on her face and her slow wide-eyed 
movements. For instance, while delivering a sermon to the workers in the Underground 
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Cathedral, the real Maria fades out of view and her image is overlaid with a depiction of the 
story she is narrating. 'She becomes, in a manner of speaking, part of the scenery', Rebecca 
Sims comments77 . While, technically, this is also a device for a silent film to tell her story, 
nevertheless it enacts a movement of self-erasure. 
Blade Runner clearly borrows from this template for driving out frightening, sexual, 
Woman-machine hybrids. The film opens with the visual motif of a huge blue eye looking out 
over a panorama of Los Angeles in 2019 where, like Metropolis, the cityscape is dominated by 
a pyramid; in this case belonging to the powerful TYRELL corporation. As in Metropolis, there 
is a clear social stratification based on access to city levels, and, like the metaphor and the 
reality of the Tyrell pyramid; only a few get to the natural sunlight at the top or even to the 
upper levels. 
Far below, Rick Deckard is completely at home in a street level bar, surrounded by 
the 'babble' of City-Speak. In the technologies of the city, he is completely at home. Here, the 
street offers a metaphor for human reality in Blade Runner. It is the place where bodies 
collide, real people talk, argue and exchange, and technologies are at home, greasy and used 
rather than rarefied and sublime. Deckard's job as a Blade Runner requires him to 'retire' 
replicants, or biologically manufactured humanoids, who are used as slaves in off-world 
colonies but who are illegal on Earth. Effectively, Deckard is a member of the identity police in 
much the same way as Anton in Gattaca. Whereas in Blade Runner's source novel, Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?78 the androids are characterised as inhuman by their lack 
of affect, the TYRELL corporation in Blade Runner, not only manufactures replicants who are 
physically superior but has implanted artificial memories of childhood in them which has 
produced affect. So while the androids are characterised by their lack, the replicants are 
characterised by their supplements. Because of these supplemented memories, the replicants 
have developed emotions·over time and a desire for freedom from their off-world slavery. As a 
policeman of identity, Deckard naturally provides a 'control' character in comparison to which 
the other replicants are contrasted. Deckard's own masculine coolness and lack of affect 
serves both as a constant contrast to the desperation of the replicants and as a moral 
reminder of the arbitrariness of the test he must administer to gauge humanity. 79 
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The paradox at the heart of Blade Runner, is that while it explicitly asks the question 
'what is a man?', it also implicitly demonstrates greater differences between man and woman 
than there are between humans and replicants. The question 'what is a man?', Blade Runner 
shows, can only be answered by also asking 'what is a woman?' Hence, the film's narrative 
resolution is achieved by reinforcing misogynistic stereotypes of femininity, sexuality and of 
Woman. Interestingly, there are no 'real' women in Blade Runner, all the female figures are 
replicants. By doing this, Blade Runner not only focuses the action on deciding what a 'real' 
man is but also this avoids the problematics of what a real woman might be. Femininity is 
something that is programmed into the hardware, whereas membership in the family of Man is 
much more spiritual and transcendent, as the replicant Roy Batty's and Deckard's final 
moments together in the film strongly suggest. In the film's quest to reach this point of 
knowledge, what constitutes a Man, what a woman is, and what she might become in the hi-
tech environment must be strictly contained and policed. Blade Runner demonstrates the 
extreme violence involved in the containment and policing of female figures, and the 
punishment for female figures who step outside of this. This process begins high in the 
rarefied air of the TYRELL pyramid, where identity policeman Deckard tests Rachael for her 
humanity and decides: 
Deckard: She's a replicant, isn't she? 
Tyrell: I'm impressed. How many questions does it usually take to spot them? 
Deckard: I don't get it Tyrell. 
Tyrell: How many questions? 
Deckard: Twenty, thirty, cross-referenced. 
Tyrell: It took more than a hundred for Rachael, didn't it? 
Deckard: She doesn't know?! 
Tyrell: She's beginning to suspect, I think. 
Deckard: Suspect? How can it not know what it is? 
Tyrell: Commerce is our goal here at Tyrell. More human than human is our motto. 
Rachael is an experiment, nothing more. We began to recognize in them strange 
obsessions. After all they are emotionally inexperienced with only a few years in which 
to absorb the experiences which you and I take for granted. If we give them the past we 
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create a cushion or pillow for their emotions and consequently we can control them 
better. 
The pleasures of commerce, science and their associated power and narratives of 
domination result in the world of Blade Runner, in Maria spawning three female replicants: 
Pris, Zhora and Rachael. Like the false Maria, all three are highly sexualised and operate 
within an economy of deep sexism and misogyny enforced by identity police like Deckard, 
manufacturers like Tyrell and their various technologies of codifying, of looking and of 
domination. Tyrell's brutal comment that 'Rachael is an experiment, nothing more', an 
experiment driven by the imperatives of the market, is nevertheless a logical historical 
extrapolation of the exchange value of women and their bodies in many social institutions, 
such as marriage and prostitution. However, spoken by one who is represented as an 
omniscient God-figure it is somewhat surprising that neither Tyrell nor the film, in any small 
way, ever acknowledges how much the gender and sexuality of the replicants is radically 
constructed and entirely beyond any stale theoretical arguments about nature versus nuture. 
Rachael, Pris and Zhora are embodied radical constructions of female figuration. As Simone 
de Beauvoir famously argued in The Second Sex 'woman is made, not born,' 80 
Contributing to Rachael's manufacture are the implant of prosthetic memories which 
act as technologies of control. These memories might be usefully compared to the functioning 
of cultural narratives in the sense that they create an illusion of truth for each individual which 
is implicit and collusive in lived experience. Pris, another of the female replicants, is described 
as a 'standard issue army pleasure model', equipped with appropriate prosthetic memories to 
enable her to function. This places her at the degrading level of an inflatable plastic sex doll 
and the indentured prostitute. Pris lives out these memories and her function through a 
mixture of childishness, innocence and canny manipulativeness which are symbolically 
representative of both the desire and fear of women in this film, and are clear derivatives from 
Maria. While Zhora, the third female replicant, is a killer designed for 'Political Homicide', on 
earth she works undercover in a seedy bar as a stripper and, with obvious biblical 
resonances, a snake charmer. What little we see of Zhora's life before her violent execution is 
shown to be a series of representations inside representations. While her pornographic stage 
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act urges the male audience to 'watch her take the pleasures of the snake', this is an 
undercover act for her role as political assassin, which is the only role given her in her 
manufacture, and which is the reason for her desire for freedom. She must perform all of 
these opposing roles within the boundaries and according to the prescriptions of femininity 
described and circumscribed by her prosthetic memories. 
In keeping with the film's logic, as females to be both desired and punished, Zhora 
and Pris are executed violently in a way that is both highly sexualised and voyeuristic. 
Deckard visits Zhora in her dressing room pretending to be an 'artists' representative' 
investigating, with obvious irony, sexual harassment in her job. 'Little dirty holes' may be in 
your dressing room he tells her, to which she replies sardonically: 'are you for real?', bored, 
jaded and only slightly amused by the ridiculousness of Deckard's cover as she strips off her 
stage act outfit, readying herself for another role. By articulating this question, Zhora reverses 
the order of questioner/questionee: this is the question he would like to ask of her. Deckard is 
not very good at playing this game, however, and would rather get back to his authorised role 
as policeman. Lack of respect for Deckard's authority is dangerous for all the females in Blade 
Runner. Shortly after this scene, Zhora's gruesome death is captured by a slow camera 
speed, voyeuristically panning over her dash through plate glass shop windows, clad only in 
bra and pants under a transparent raincoat. She is cut up and shot by Deckard in the back, 
the sound of her violent death silenced, objectified and aestheticised under slow, sad music. 
As she falls to the ground, she is watched only by the unseeing eyes of naked plastic store 
mannequins, which, finally, reveals the true value of her life in the Blade Runner world. Coded 
as an object of perverse desire, Deckard masters and possesses her bodily and visually in the 
end. 
Later in the film, Pris' death is also dramatised as a pseudo-sexual encounter with 
Deckard and filmed in such a way as to heighten voyeuristic pleasures. Pris and Deckard's 
encounter begins with Pris disguising herself as a life-size doll amongst other dolls as though 
to erase herself through camouflage. This throws up powerful visual resonances for her 
female replicant figuration, but also is reminiscent of the real Maria's erasure in Metropolis. 
However, Pris is a good Maria but she is very dangerous. When Pris fights Deckard she 
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attempts to strangle him in a hold between her thighs and succeeds momentarily in physically 
overwhelming him with her sexuality. 
Andreas Huyssen points out that the fear of female sexuality, of castration or 
invagination but above all of emasculation, is clearly acted out here. Deckard could die 
between Pris' legs and so to pay her back he fucks her by blowing her away with his gun. 
Pris, as the standard army pleasure model, is thus killed in a manner resonant of violence and 
sex, and also, of violence to her body, the body she could not own herself, but could only be 
traded in her life as a sex slave. Her lover, Roy Batty, later tastes the blood from the gaping 
bloody hole in the centre of her chest. Enraged at Deckard's symbolic rape of Pris and her 
death, Roy Batty finally tortures Deckard; saying 'this is for Pris,' while he breaks one of 
Deckard's fingers. Pris' body had been used by another man, suggested in the metaphor of 
her gaping wound. Yet this metaphor of sharing will be what ultimately brings Batty and 
Deckard together in brotherly rivalry, enacting Mark Jenkins' of the fragmentation and then the 
recapture of stability. 
The violence Rachael endures is more subtle. While Pris and Zhora are 
representative of Metropolis' false Maria and, like her death on the bonfire, they are accorded 
a violent death by Deckard, Rachael (as a kind of real Maria) is given a reprieve by Deckard 
once he is convinced that she is harmless, and when he falls in love with her and wants to 
possess her. In the economy of exchange that operates within Blade Runner, Deckard's 
desire to possess and keep Rachael means that she is given the right to an existence and a 
continued life. Nevertheless, Deckard's desire also manifests itself violently. Rachael and 
Deckard's first 'love' scene together begins with Deckard grabbing her forcefully and pushing 
her against a wall while she struggles to resist him. However, the deep misogyny of the film's 
figural economy is once again reinforced when Rachael, who until that point was cold, distant, 
and aloof toward Deckard, cannot help but respond to Deckard's 'passion'. As Stevi Jackson 
and Sue Scott explain: 'Within dominant cultural discourses, men are cast as the active 
initiators of sexual activity and women as passive recipients of male advances; men's desires 
are seen as uncontrollable urges which women are paradoxically expected to both sati sf y 
and restrain'. 81 Thus Deckard's initial sexual coercion and the underlying threat of serious 
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violence is justified, tran sf ormed and sanitised by the film as a natural part of his potent 
masculinity and desire, while Rachael's initial reticence is re-scripted as her own appropriate 
demureness. By acquiescing to Deckard's mastery, his status as a potent male is reinforced. 
Reading this violence and commerce as deep sexism and misogyny tran sf erred over 
into the technocultural realm is one level of analysis, however, reading the narrative and 
structural need for these codings of perversity, violence, desire and misogyny is another level 
of analysis that is crucial to understanding how the film is able to answer the question it 
constantly and explicitly asks; that is, 'what is a man?' As noted earlier, Gayatri Spivak 
explains this structural phenomenon as masculinist discourse manufacturing woman as 
metaphor, their metaphor, and so woman becomes an instrument of self-assertion rather than 
a subject within herself. 82 This usage of female figuration is clearly in evidence in Blade 
Runner and Metropolis. The women here are indeed technological instruments and so, as 
Spivak's would argue, Maria, Pris, Zhora and Rachael are then merely prosthetic extensions 
of Frederson's, Tyrell's and Deckard's subjectivities. For this reason, Tyrell's prosthetic 
memories, which create a 'cushion' for the replicants' identities, can be seen as the 
discourses of Man used as instruments to assert his own identity as humanist man, still alive 
and well in the imaginary time of 2019. If female replicants can be seen as tropes of femininity 
materialised, underwriting and guaranteeing a masculinist economy of heterosexual gender, 
then these tropes are what secure the structure and ascendancy of the male discourse within 
the films. Man is the seer. What he sees is woman who is the Other to his self. The discourse 
of the white, masculine, heterosexual group requires the metaphors of the monster or the 
female as prostitute, snake charmer, stripper, to be feared and desired. In this way, the films 
represent a theory of femininity where the female can never inhabit her own terms: she can 
only ever be a replicant (robot) or positioned as a materialised trope of male discourse. 
This is clearly shown as a gendered distinction and not a distinction between real and 
replicant robot by virtue of Roy Batty's (Bladerunner) tran sf ormation from replicant position 
as Other into a Man. His transition is dramatised at the end of the film in his heroic, hand-to-
hand fight with Deckard. It is important that the violence that Deckard and Batty deal out to 
one another at the end is coded as an enacting of brotherly rivalry which ultimately confirms 
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the masculinity and status as subject of each. This is quite a different to the violence enacted 
against the females. As Teresa de Lauretis explains in relation to this kind of inherently 
masculine violence in film: 'The distinctive trait here is "reciprocity" and thus, by implication, 
the equality of the two terms of the violent exchange'. 83 It is interesting, then, that this 
exchange is not lacking in its homoerotic undertones. It is Batty, though, who chooses to strip 
to his underwear for this final scene, and, his body oiled, tanned and muscled, he performs 
various aesthetically filmed gymnastics, and when he hurts Deckard the film codes this as a 
kind of sado-masochism. Batty presents himself to be looked at but the resonances are 
different from those which code the female figures. Here, Batty is in control and he is stronger 
than Deckard whose exhausted body, as emblematic of the crisis to him and all he stands for, 
is always breaking down, being hurt. Quoting freely from poetry and making various classical 
references, Batty also presents his own body as like Christ's by driving nails through his 
hands and so presenting himself as a vessel of God rather than as a sublime machine or a 
mediocre human. Finally, Batty murmurs heroically: 'I've seen things you people wouldn't 
believe. Attack ships on fire off the Shoulder of Orion. I watched C-Beams glitter in the dark 
near Tannhauser Gate. All these moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. Time to die.' 
As noted earlier, humanist Man is not really a unitary figure, but rather a 
conglomeration of conjoined figures. It is interesting, then, that in addition to Deckard's 
ravaged body, a most spectacular representation of the weakening of humanist Man is that 
Metropolis, BladeRunner, and William Gibson's Neuromancer (which will be examined in the 
following chapter) contain an ageing patriarchial figure who is coded in a similar way. Given 
that all three texts deal with the erosion of power of the masculine humanist subject in the face 
of technological change, it is interesting that this ageing figure is the one part of this figure 
who either cannot cope with the new worlds the texts represent, or, alternatively, has become 
so tainted and perverse with his close association with technologies that he is unable to be 
reincorporated. Contamination from machines is a common technocultural anxiety. What is 
surprising, however, is the degree of convergence of the representations. The figures of Joh 
Frederson (Metropolis), Tyrell (Bladerunner) and Tessier-Ashpool (Neuromancer) are all 
shown to be maniacal, deluded, perverse, grotesque, and full of a vampire-like machine 
- 63 -
desire. Additionally, they all exist in lofty fortified environments, safe and far away from the 
busy exchange of life on the street or in the factory and incredibly out of touch with the 
experience of daily life, of the people over whom they have such enormous influence. Even 
though they all embrace technology (and their extravagant existences depend upon it) these 
figures are represented as conservative, aristocratic, eccentric and as collectors of 
memorabilia of the past. There is an overtone in all texts of a certain nineteenth-century 
colonial decadence, which is contrasted to the industrialised and postindustrial worlds in 
which they live. Gibson explains this distinction in the context of power where these 
patriarchal figures have become unable to properly adapt: 'He remembered the litter of the old 
man's chamber, the soiled humanity of it, the ragged spines of the old audio disks in their 
paper sleeves. One foot bare, the other in a velvet slipper.' When Molly Millions, the female 
cyborg figure in Neuromancer, manages to penetrate the security of Tessier-Ashpool's Villa 
Straylight, she finds him with his velvet slippers and a silk dressing gown in the middle of an 
elaborate suicide, complete with expensive bottles of brandy, sleeping pills, old-fashioned 
hypodermic needles, and a pistol: 'You are a very rude girl. Suicides here are conducted with 
a degree of decorum', Tessier-Ashpool informs her. In the corner of his bedroom lies one of 
his cloned daughters, raped and bloodily slaughtered by him: 'I'd order a Jane thawed, when I 
woke. Strange to lie every few decades with what legally amounts to one's own daughter' 84 
the old man explains. This figure of 'soiled humanity,' adheres to old-fashioned decorum; 
outdated practices, and has tran sf armed from a figure of huge power into a monster. 
Similarly, perversity and vampire overtones are represented through Tyrell in Blade 
Runner . When Roy Batty and Pris manage to penetrate Tyrell's inner sanctum, his bedroom, 
they find an extravagant baroque haven where Tyrell engages in the gentlemanly pursuit of 
chess. Tyrell is also shown as shrunken and aged beside his creations, Roy and Pris, and 
with his massively oversized spectacles: 'All the better to look at you, dear', seems to come to 
mind without the question having ever been explicitly asked. And Tyrell, like the wolf who 
devours virgins who stray from the straight and narrow, is dangerous, although his power is 
weakening. Before crushing Tyrell's skull between his bare hands, Roy Batty gives his maker 
a long last kiss on the lips. The ambivalence towards Tyrell is thus reinforced: he is both to be 
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loved and despised. In contrast, Metropolis, being the oldest and most conservative of the 
texts depicts the aged patriarch as not irredeemably lost. While Joh Frederson is certainly 
represented as a decadent, megalomaniac patriarch, complete with velvet dinner jacket, 
classical tastes, and immense lofty office, he is able to be saved by his incorporation into 
Christian resolution narratives at the end of the film. His contamination from machines is not 
complete; he had made a proper distinction. 
The latent anxiety over maintaining some integrity for these figures in decline is 
signalled by the sheer level of misogyny and the texts' unwillingness to deconstruct this 
misogyny at any point. Whereas female replicants/robot deaths are violent and turn male 
characters, and the audience into voyeurs, the death of the male replicant, Roy Batty, turns 
him into the seer whose view makes him a philosopher, hero, and ultimately affirms his place 
as humanist Man. This makes it not merely an interesting film that represents a misogynist, hi-
tech future, but rather a filmic text which implicitly supports this representation. Judith Butler 
provides an interesting comment on this phenomenon in 'Imitation and Gender 
Insubordination'. Describing the relationship of various parody gender performances (such as 
the butch-femme, the transvestite in drag) to the sexist economy of gender and compulsory 
heterosexuality. She writes: 'The parodic or imitative effect of gay identities works neither to 
copy nor to emulate heterosexuality, but rather, to expose heterosexuality as an incessant and 
panicked imitation of its own naturalized idealization.' 85 
The description of heavily gendered heterosexist identity as a 'panicked imitation' of 
itself is useful. By way of contrast, the degree to which highly masculinist figures reassert 
gendered binaries, rather than exposing them, makes these texts inherently conservative for 
they do not attempt imagining any new potential figurations. In addition, seeing the figural 
performances as panicked relates equally well to the extreme hard-headed masculinity of 
Deckard to the extreme evilness associated with Zhora's sexuality. The panic is not limited to 
female figuration. If anything, within technoculture, when technologies, as artefacts which 
challenge historical untjerstanding of identity, meet with the body, often the resulting cyborg 
figures can be characterised by this kind of 'incessant and panicked imitation of [their] own 
naturalized idealization'. 
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The realm of technoculture presents many examples. Lara Croft, who is the star of the 
highly succes sf ul PlayStation game Toomraider, is a souped-up cyberchick enacting a 
similar kind of panicked performance of gender identity which Butler describes in relation to 
the queering of heterosexual gender identity. Just as our historically-derived understanding of 
the natural body collapses, technocultural representations of the female cyborg body becomes 
more like 'panicked imitations'. of their lost naturalized idealization. The first aspect of this 
anxious performance is the extreme femaleness of her representation: Lara's body is a hybrid 
of the postmodern armoured hardbody and the more traditional hour-glass figure with 
impossibly tiny waist, huge breasts and curved hips. Typically, Lara is clad in only a pair of 
brief shorts and a straining tank top. More significant than her clothes, however, is her 
weaponry: she is armed with large hi-tech state-of-the-art artillery. The more Lara is 
'masculinised' through her weaponry and her muscled hardbody, the more her designers have 
compensated by giving her a stereotyped and exaggerated femaleness (soft voice, huge 
breasts and narrow waist). In addition, the perspectives the game offers of Lara always seems 
to be those which heighten most the vicarious and voyeuristic pleasures of her performances, 
whether she is made to swan-dive off cliffs, perform fantastic leaps and kicks or run while 
shooting from the hip. These kinds of technocultural texts contain no element of self-
consciousness about their extant gender anxiety, or what the source of this anxiety might be, 
nor are they playful with this gender representation; rather it is taken very seriously. This is 
hard to do considering the kind of grotesque proportions the figures have. 
Louise Allen and Radhika Mohanram argue that Lara's figuration is not an 
empowering one for versions of active technocultural femininity. However, they put this down 
to her wearing femininity as 'an act of transvesticism' in the same way, they argue, that Ripley 
from the Alien trilogy does86. Important to their argument is that Lara's 'foundational identity' is 
implicitly masculine. If Lara wears femininity as an act of transvesticism, then her performance 
must be to expose this act as a performance, according to Butler's argument. To a degree, 
Lara's figural representation does undermine itself as a serious female representation by the 
almost parodaic extremeness of her female features. However, this is not the same as the 
knowingness of the performance of transvesticism. Further, in propounding for Lara a 
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'foundational identity,' Allen and Mohanram imply that there can be a foundational identity, 
and that that identity is Man or, as they put it, an Indiana Jones or other such similar heroic 
masculine adventure figure. 
The difference between these texts and ones that do expose gender as a naturalised 
idealisation, to borrow from Butler's comment, draws attention to the manufacture of gender in 
hi-tech female figurations, that is they radically change the movement from one of 
naturalisation (albeit a panicked one) to implicit critique. The problem with the heavily 
gendered figures in both Metropolis and Blade Runner is that they naturalise and sustain their 
own gendered representations. At no point is the constructedness of their representations 
revealed, in the way the shiny metal carapace is revealed when Maria's flesh body is burned 
off. Too much of the stability of the valorised term, Man, depends upon this representation. 
In contrast, 'Feminine Intuition' (1969), a short story by the prolific sf writer Isaac 
Asimov, the manufacturers of a potential 'girl robot' openly discuss manipulating the so-called 
'self-evident givens' of gender and sex embodied in a robot. As they wish to create a robot 
with 'flawed logical paths in its positronic brain' in order to increase its powers of free 
association, they consider it useful to disguise this potentially frightening creature under a 
femininised shell: 'A girl robot?' A smile made its way about the conference table ... 'All right a 
girl robot. Our robots are sexless, of course, and so will this one be, but we always act as 
though they're male. We give then male pet names and call them he and him .... If we 
announce a female robot, it doesn't matter what she is. The public will automatically assume 
she is mentally backward. We just publicize the robot as Jane-1 and we don't have to say 
another word. We're safe.'87 
Jane-1 is a feminised machine because her relation to meaning is problematic, she is 
expected to learn to interpret, empathise, understand through simulations of feelings and 
intuit: she represents, in this way, the feminine pathos rather than the masculine logos. The 
difference between Asimov's story and Metropolis and Blade Runner, is that the story at least 
makes explicit the choices that make up the constructedness of gender identity and its 
collusion in the creation of stable Man even if this constructedness is being both exploited and 
further naturalised by the characters in the story. By contrast, the two film texts perform the 
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opposite move in order to reinforce their stereotypes of femininity which are, as I have shown, 
crucial to the maintenance of the humanist masculine-coded figure. It is interesting, then, that 
the figure of Tyrell is replaced by a woman in Asimov's famous series of short stories; 
however, gone is Tyrell's high self-indulgence, the perversity, the omnipotence and the 
vampire resonances in keeping with Blade Runner's implicit criticism of his unnatural, wrong 
desires to usurp God's right. Instead, Asimov's text has its own representational logic which 
offers up a sad realisation of the limitations of feminine empowerment. Dr. Susan Calvin is 
portrayed as an ascetic, frigid, cold, hard and, hence, highly rational woman. In order to be a 
brilliant robopsycologist she must give up anything resembling cultural perceptions of 
gendered femininity, almost as indulgences. Calvin hates men, it is implicitly suggested, and 
for this reason when the men at her company United States Robots do not understand how 
she can be sure about one of her conclusions, her response is: 'Carefully, she rose to her 
feet, and said sardonically, "how can I be sure? ... Call it feminine intuition.' In this way Calvin 
mocks their belief system that would make the robot feminine, and that would understand her 
reasoning in terms of intuition. She makes evident what is implicit but unspoken. In keeping 
with this logic, Calvin is stripped of her sexuality, she 'asks no favors and beats the men at 
their own game. To be sure, she remains unfulfilled-but you can't have everything.' 88 The 
high price for respect in the patriarchal realm of technoscience is playing the unfair patriarchal 
game at which Susan Calvin is at a disadvantage. Just as Lara is heavily feminised in order to 
balance her 'masculinisation' through heavy artillery and physical prowess, here Susan Calvin 
has her 'femininity' erased so that she may become like a man in a female body. The 
comment, 'you can't have everything' really should be prefaced with 'If you are a woman ... ' In 
this way, Butler's comment that heterosexuality is 'an incessant and panicked imitation of its 
own naturalized idealization' may be extended to gender representations of female figures. 
Although Asimov's opus is hardly representative of a nascent feminism, at least, as 
this text demonstrates, there is an awareness of the constructedness of gender. This 
awareness is also the beginning of its deconstruction. 
Common to all these texts is the way they explicitly illustrate the lack of real power for 
feminine representations within technoculture. In Technologies of the Gendered Body, Anne 
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Balsamo describes Foucault's concept of technology as 'the process of connection between 
discursive practices, institutional relations, and material effects that, working together, 
produce a meaning of a "truth effect" for the human body.89' Drawing on this Foucaultian 
framework, Balsamo elaborates that the process of producing these effects may be called 
articulation, which involves both "'expressing" that which is already given or operative and in 
the sense of conjoining or connecting'. However, with so many other theories convincingly 
elaborating the construction of desire and the desire to express oneself as an individual, the 
line between choice and freedom becomes very blurred and problematic. While general 
metatheories are useful and necessary for particular critical purposes, they also have their 
limits. This is why each case and representation must be examined for its variety of 
influences. So, if I will suggest one metatheory at this juncture, it is that the worlds of 
Metropolis and BladeRunner certainly create the figurations for hi-tech identity which are 
articulated through domination. In contrast, the two novels I examine next, Neuromancer and 




Chapter Five: Narrating Unoriginal Experience: Prostheses and 
Postmodern Bodies 
'The pursuit of radical metaphor ... is a risky business' 
-Samuel Delany, Reading at Work 
'Man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end' 
-Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 
With its machine fusions, the cyborg offers a radical metaphor for the transgression of 
traditional boundaries and limits such as are inscribed in the concepts of the body, the human, 
and the notion of the humanist individual. As it is always engaged in this process of radically 
disrupting received notions of otherness, the cyborg is a boundary-crossing figure which 
challenges the stability of logocentric Man and his extant ideologies. But just as Man is not 
one figure, nor do cyborgs trangress boundaries in the same ways. Rather there are multiple 
forms of cyborged selves and bodies which offer up different figurations. While in the earlier 
chapters I have focused on the recuperation and reaffirmation of a logocentric figure of Man, 
this chapter will principally discuss William Gibson and Samuel Delany's representations of 
cyborg figures who are knowingly implicated in technological (re)construction whihch does not 
recuperate old orders. These new figural possibilities offer up a form of response to the 
logocentric urge to continually (re)create hierarchies and separations between self and Other. 
However, both Neuromancer and Stars problematise these new figures and explicitly 
demonstrate their limits and weaknesses. I will discuss these limitations and weaknesses 
primarily in terms of disruption and reconstruction of the notions of location, origin, narrative 
and knowledge. 
If cyberpunk is, as Frederic Jameson contends, 'the supreme literary expression if not 
of postmodernism, then of late capitalism itself90 then William Gibson's classic Neuromancer 
(1984) must surely be the epitome of the postmodern just as it is considered to be the classic 
cyberpunk novel. Jameson is not alone in maintaining this reading of cyberpunk; other critics 
such as Peter Fitting and David Harvey also see cyberpunk identities as consummately 
representative of postmodern identities. 91 For the sake of this argument, postmodern identities 
may be characterised as ones which eschew transcendent metanarratives, hierarchised 
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orders, secure locations-including the location of the body-and have an unprecedented 
aversion to unmediated or authentic experience, which is also implicit in the loss of origins. 
While Neuromancer's plot is quite pedestrian and adds nothing new to the generic 
expectations of generic thriller or detective fiction, what is interesting are the rich instances of 
human-machine fusion. These instances may be placed along a continuum, ranging from 
most real to most representational which also narrate varying possibilities of figurations which 
do not recuperate humanist man or his hybrid of parts. In this world, people's intimacy with 
technologies manifests itself mainly through technologies of the body and technologies of 
place; both of which are ultimately technologies of location each regulating the other. On the 
body, the ubiquity of implants, genetic alterations, cosmetic enhancements, and machine-
mind interfaces abound. In stark contrast to Gattaca, cyberpunk texts welcome monsterish 
fusions, dirty, useful and intimate machines and celebrate the ability to tran sf arm the body 
and self. In this way, technologies here are not about the dramatic heroics of the sublime 
spectacle, as cyberpunk advocate and writer Bruce Stirling explains: 
For the cyberpunks ... technology is visceral. It is not the bottled genie of Big Science 
boffins; it is pervasive, utterly intimate. Not outside us, but next to us. Under the skin; 
often, inside our minds. Technology itself has changed. Not for us the giant steam 
snorting wonders of the past: the Hoover Dam, the Empire State building, the nuclear 
power plant. Eighties tech sticks to the skin, responds to the touch: the personal 
computer, the Sony walkman, the portable telephone, the soft contact lens92 
The creation of prosthetic identity provides a cultural narrative which has replaced 
stories about Nature or Origins. Speaking at the New York Review of Science Fiction, Samuel 
Delany clarifies this point: 'The thrust of the cyberpunk speculation on the body's future has 
tended to move in clearly-defined prosthetic directions-along with prosthesis's subcategory: 
the cosmetic'.93 Certainly, as Delany suggests there is a fascination with cosmetic alterations 
in Neuromancer. Additionally, these cosmetic alterations index the integral reworking of 
culture and society through the medium of technologies as it is manifested on the body as a 
malleable site of change. The ubiquity of these cosmetic alterations results in beauty 
becoming banality: many faces in Neuromancer are described as a 'forgettable blend' of the 
most famous and beautiful simstim stars. The fascination with the cosmetic means that faces 
and alterations are constantly narrated in the text: 'Case turned his head and looked up into 
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Wage's face. It was a tanned and forgettable mask. The eyes were vatgrown sea-green Nikon 
transplants. Wage wore a suit of gunmetal silk and a simple bracelet of platinum on either 
wrist. He was flanked by his joeboys, nearly identical young men, their arms and shoulders 
bulging with grafted muscle.' 94 , These 'nearly identical' people lose their individual differences 
and instead becoming indistinguishable with 'forgettable masks'. This section of the populace 
use technology to shore up the anxieties of individual difference by recreating a Perfect Image 
of the Same, which is also a perfect image of banality. 
The choice whether to have cosmetic surgery or not seems at least partly related to 
locations. In some parts of the city, for instance, ugliness is expected, albeit considered 
'heraldic'95 While a 'heraldic' individual may be a natural and, hence, legendary monster, some 
choose to make themselves into monsters which is not nearly so horrifying. The element of 
choice involved in the production of these aesthetics makes it mainstream. For this reason, 
people are less easily distinguished by their individual personalities than by their unique and 
peculiar variations, additions, mutations of their bodies. Recalling the fate of his friend McCoy 
Pauley, Case muses: 'his heart had done for him in the end. His surplus Russian heart, 
implanted in a POW camp during the war. He'd refused to replace the thing, saying he needed 
its particular beat to maintain his sense of timing'. In this way Pauley was a casualty from not 
fully embracing the cyborg body as work in process. Too much concern for origins or originals 
are shown to be disabling for individuals in the Neuromancerworld. 
In contrast to those for whom bodily alteration is important, the cyberpunk contempt 
for the flesh means that he does not enhance himself. Instead, presents himself as a 
postmodern antihero with all of the necessary accoutrements; nihilistic, survivalist, cynical of 
authority, addicted, improvising, machine literate. There is a deep glamour about these 
disaffected hacker cowboys with their mirrorshades and black leathers.96 They symbolise 
ways in which the technologically literate, through brokering information and skill, can 'feed 
noise' back into the system. However, unlike the punk movement itself, cyberpunks are not so 
abrasive, aggressive or even so energetic. Feeding noise back into the system is not really an 
expression of rage and desire for real political change, but rather just an addiction to 'altered 
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states' provided by technologies and drugs and a way to summon up the capital for another 
day in life97 . 
The notion of addiction to technologies or compulsion to augmentation plays itself out 
through various cyborged representations. For instance, in this world, billions of 'users' spend 
much of their lives jacked up to stimulated reality shows, called simstim, which are described 
as 'consensual hallucinations' 98. Jacked in users of simstim live out recorded and edited 'texts' 
of lived simstim stars' experiences and, hence, are shown to be utterly tuned in and dropped 
out of their own. The conflation of drug taking with simstim is clear and Gibson emphasises 
their mutual addictiveness. However, while drug taking is an habitual part of the cyberpunk's 
life, the mediated experience of simstim is looked upon with the contempt by the cyberpunk as 
technologies which the multiplication of flesh 'input'. 
Eliminating flesh input is the cyberspace realm. This is the privileged 'location' of 
cyberpunks, a realm of pure data and information representation, which occludes the need for 
enhanced bodily experience. While the desire to shift the mind into the experience of an 
idealised simstim bodily experience is considered contemptible by the cyberpunks, leaving the 
body behind in cyberspace is considered an understated heroics. Case defines himself 
through this mode of expression; as living 'for the bodiless exhaltation of cyberspace' 99 . 
Conversely, falling out of cyberspace is also falling into 'the prison of his own flesh'. Because 
of his hatred of embodied experience, Case consistently describes his body as 'the meat,' 
mocking any residual sanctity with which the body might have once been imbued. Cyberspace 
is thus a place beyond bodily limits where his body becomes a vessel for potential multiple 
technologised escapes. Since Gibson first used the word 'cyberspace,' the concept it 
embodies has been extensively theorised by numerous critics as providing an irresistible link 
to various brands of postmodern theory. Robert Markley suggests in Virtual Realities100 that it 
is as if all of our tales about the traditional subject have been translated into the new medium 
of cyberspace with the profound division between mind and matter wholly retained by the 
cyberspace paradigm. (I will discuss the implications of the loss of the body further on.) 
In contrast Molly treats her body as an intricate tool, functional and athletic, with 
nerves spliced-up to superhuman speed and muscles technologically strengthened, implanted 
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fingertip blades and eyes protected and hidden behind a pair of skin-sealed mirror shades. 
Disconcertingly, these twin mirrors reveal nothing of her gaze but only reflect back the look of 
the observer. Molly does not like self-disclosure, and her mirrors, symbolise this. With her 
enhancements, Molly is lethal and enjoys her power: 'She held out her hands, palms up, the 
white fingers slightly spread, and with a barely audible click, ten double-edged, four-
centimeter scalpel blades slid from their housings beneath the burgundy nails. She smiled. 
The blades slowly withdrew.' 101 Molly revels in her state of enhancement. But if she is shown 
to be self-assured and completely lacking in any of the traditional trappings of femininity, then 
this is juxtaposed to her recent past as a 'meat puppet', or prostitute. Meat puppets rent their 
bodies out for hire while a 'neural cutout' blocks their conscious minds from the experience 
and replaces it instead with the customer's choice of programme. Molly says that it was a 
'Joke, to start with, 'cause once they plant the cutout chip, it seems like free money. Wake up 
sore, sometimes, but that's it. Renting the goods, is all. You aren't in, when it's all happening.' 
The concept that Molly was able to vacate herself from 'the goods' exemplifies, once again, a 
transference of the Cartesian split between mind and body over into a realm where the mind 
has become a cyberspace and the body has become a commodified resource. Trading on this 
assumption, for Molly it seems a fair equation that in order to empower herself with an 
enhanced body, she had to pay for it by first renting out this resource. While Molly clearly 
views the notion of origin as passivity, vulnerability, helplessness, she also articulates her 
understanding of bodily trade which allows her to escape the confines of an originary past in 
the first place. Far from being innocent and essential the body is a tool for transformation, a 
means to an end, a case that can, and must be, constantly enhanced in order to survive in the 
various technological environments. 
In both, sketching a sense of the technologised location is important. Technologised locations 
in these texts are both bodies and places so, in addition, to bodily enhancing technologies in 
Gibson, for instance, cities are also technologies of the self. However, knowledge, too, needs 
a location and, so, the subject's articulation into these technologies and technologised 
locations is crucial to epistemology. Hence, location is another important technology of these 
radically cyborged figures. The city becomes a technology to which the self becomes 
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prosthetically attached. These places offer up a continuum from the most real and authentic to 
the most representational, just as identities do in the novel. Peter Fitting explains, 'people 
depend on technology to mediate and re-present their experiences and perceptions for them' 
resulting in an 'aversion to any original or unmediated experience'. 102 From Freeside, an 
orbital paradise, with its wealthy, cosmetically-obsessed people, recorded sky and other 
theme park special effects, to Earth cities covered by domes to seal out the polluted weather, 
to the corporate-owned self-sufficient arcologies where most of the middle class live, work, 
and relax, never venturing outside. Zion is an orbital spindle where spiritual low-tech 
Rastafarians live in low-gravity which contrasts to cyberspace which is described as: 'lines of 
light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data' where things 
appear as you imagine their representation. And finally, the Zone which is a thoroughly 
postmodern space where heterogeneous bodies collide and the endless 'biz' is conducted. 
Through these representations, the novel clearly shows place to be a technology of the self 
which influences the articulation of identity. People's intimacy with technologies manifests 
itself mainly through technologies of the body and technologies of place; both of which are 
ultimately technologies of location. I would like to add to this matrix that these relationships 
regulate each other to a degree. Living in a certain technological location requires certain 
enhancements; while, conversely, certain enhancements require a specific realm to gain their 
meaning. 
Loss of authenticity in the novel also involves the loss of trust and origins. The logical 
extension of this is that there are almost no references to families as organising units nor are 
there real friendships. Signifying an expression of static unchosen origins, old-fashioned 
social and cultural logics, families are a liability. Similarly, friendships signify trust and lack of 
autonomy. The only relations between people are business relations, relationships based on 
mutual need, or brief and untrusting associations for sex; all three of which may ultimately fall 
under the sign of commerce or commodity. Commerce has displaced friendship as the code of 
survival and the portal to power, and superficial pleasures through drugs, technologies or 
enhancements replace other intimacies. Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming sense of 
isolation within the novel. Even between Case and Molly, who become lovers, there is little 
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intimacy or closeness. The Tessier-Ashpool family represents the only family unit in the text 
and it is characterised by severe dy sf unction, perversity, and inbreeding. In this world of 
shifting alligiances and wheeling and dealing, intimacy is equated with vulnerability. While 
fusions with machines proliferate and technologies are intimate with humans on a cellular 
level, the possibility of intimacy with another person has atrophied. 
The notion of renting out the body and its sensations is revisited later on in the novel 
in another form. Molly's body becomes a mobile broadcast unit while she is carrying out the 
physical work of their missions. Rigged with simstim, Case is able to flick in and out of Molly's 
sensorium experiencing her heightened sensations, movements and pain but without control 
of them. The effect of these quick physical transitions in the text, flicking in and out of Molly's 
perspective, cyberspace and his bodily 'reality,' reads like channel zapping. Televison-as an 
old-fashioned paradigm for content transmission-now becomes the new paradigm for these 
technologies. As with television, the spectator remains a spectator insofar as Case has no 
control over Molly's actions. However, Case's perspective is the novel's perspective, even 
when he is inside Molly's body which becomes a 'case' for his perspective. Nevertheless, 
Case find this technology irritating rather than fascinating, rejecting it as a 'meat toy' with its 
'gratuitous multiplication of flesh input'. 103 The experience is too authentic for him, he prefers 
the abstracted purity of the realm of data in cyberspace where bodies, even high performance 
ones, are left at home on the sofa. 
As the story progresses, however, Case increasingly experiences feelings which 
pierce through his habitual numbness. He is surprised by this, the only 'flesh inputs,' or 
feelings, he was used to were the extreme and altered rushes provided by his drug habit. So 
when Case becomes enraged, which he describes as a raw animal thing signifying its 
essentiality and authenticity, he both embraces and shuns it: 'Meat, some part of him said. It's 
the meat talking, ignore it'. 104 Fear and desire are strange feelings for him as most of his 
experiences take place inside the web where there is no 'animal', or bodily input in 
experience. It seems that his state of perpetual numbness is a result of his cyberspace 
personality taking over his Zone personality. Bodily need of any kind is a lamentable fact, and 
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Case disassociates it from himself as much as possible, thinking 'all the meat ... and all it 
wants' 105. 
Science fiction writer and post-structuralist theorist Samuel Delany explores many of 
these ideas in his work. His novel Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand can be read as an 
exploration of the radically constructed cyborg and how this figure can be disruptive to the 
practice of locating knowledges. As a disruptive potential, Delany emphases the opposite to 
Haraway's utopian cyborg figure. For his own critical and writerly practice, however, location 
and perspective are crucial. In his 1998 Longer Views: Extended Essays Delany stresses the 
importance of his position as narrator: 'When I try to articulate the positions from which I write, 
as a male, as a black male, as a gay black male whose work is the writing of paraliterary 
fictions, of which this, as you read it may be one-it seems only reasonable someone else 
may protest: "who else would cite, would mark, would take on and torture so this particular 
text?" By articulating a continuum of gender, racial, sexual and writerly positionings of 
differing privilege, Samuel Delany makes clear his belief in locating knowledges. This interest 
in subject positioning and its relation to epistemology manifests itself in Stars through a 
definite struggle between, on the one hand, what I will characterise as a radically relativist 
(and disruptive) epistemology which is unsituated and, on the other, a socially constructed 
epistemology which is deeply situated. 
Stars can be read as a struggle between these two forces-for order and for 
disruption- which begins with certainty and order and ends with loss, destruction and 
uncertainty. Part of the pleasures in reading Delany is that he is such an adept theorist 
himself. However, rather than making his texts easier to theorise, precisely the opposite is 
true: Delany's texts yield easily and self-consciously to many differing interpretations but also, 
by the same token, they undermine them. In this way his texts contain an urge to master 
meanings, precisely as it deconstructs this kind of possibility. This makes Delany's work as 
rich as it is problematic, as challenging as it is frustrating, as hugely imaginative of 
disjunctivity irrealities as it is intense about containing an almost modernist urge to instate 
critical meaning. I will return to this idea shortly. 
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In keeping with this love of complexities, the title of this dense and lavishly poetic 
novel Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand telescopes the tiny and near to the huge and far 
away, collapsing their disjunctivity. The trope 'stars ... like sand' is cognitively unsettling, 
offering at the very beginning an irresolvable aporia. This is appropriate, though, given that 
any unity of place here encompasses a universe of over 6200 worlds, richly peopled with 
human and alien cultures, which the text foregrounds abundantly in a 'laden collage surface'. 
106 Critic and sf writer Damien Broderick offers the somewhat glib narrative precis that Stars is 
about 'boy loses world, boy meets boy, boy loses boy, boy saves world'. 107 While not wishing 
to take Broderick's flippant gloss too seriously, I think it is important to note that it is deceptive 
in its implication of self-evidence and narrative closure, whereas as a writer and theorist 
Delany overtly proselytizes a post-structuralist ethic which is crucial to understanding this 
novel. 
In keeping with the gradual deconstruction of narrative, the novel is divided into a 
tripartite structure that present the reader with a distinct narrative evolution. While the 
'Prologue' is written in an unquestioningly confident third person mimic of the Classic Realist 
text, the 'Monologues' are narrated by the self-reflexive main character Marq Dyeth who is a 
highly literate interstellar industrial diplomat or, in shorthand, an ID. An ID, Marq repeatedly 
explains, is trained to be a cultural mediator and interpreter between very different worlds, yet 
as the name of his profession suggests, interpretation is never neutral as it is always a filtering 
through the cultural 'i.d.' or even the 'id' of the translator. The id offers, then, a point of fixity 
and location. Marq is firmly committed to situating his knowledges and discusses at length 
themes of identity construction, the arbitrariness of knowledge and belief systems, of social 
orders, taboos and desire yet advocating all the while the tolerant ideologies of his home 
world which, interestingly, is called 'Dyethshome'. Later in the novel when the solidity of 
Dyethshome is revealed as 'illusion and spectacle' sustained by technologies of sensory 
deception, Marq's ability to narrate also dissolves. The death of home (Dysthshome) as 
symbolic of the ability to ground knowledge is lost and all that is left is a disaffected, uncertain 
identity with no ability to feel or communicate. 
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As Rat's various cyborg tran sf ormations are so different, I will now trace this 
evolution which references radically variable notions of the constructed cyborg body. 
Rat's radical reconstruction begins on a planet where oppressive technologies 
subjugate and enslave much of the populace to serve as labour in an economy of exchange. 
Masked authorities coerce the monstrous figure of Rat with a permanent and life-changing 
proposition: "Of course,' they tell him in all honesty, 'you will be a slave". 'But', they insist, 
tantalizingly, 'you will be happy' (3). Radical Anxiety Termination, Rat's treatment, is a drastic 
and irreversible operation which removes all capacity to create links between ideas, which, 
effectively, is the removal of the ability to think at all. Weary of his life on the margins, Rat 
strongly desires to be re-made like the masked people, and pathetically mistakes the 
operation for a normalising rehabilitation. Protesting angrily, he exclaims: 'I could learn if you 
taught me!' (5) to which they reply, pronouncing their exegesis of fixed (and oppressively 
logocentric) identity: 'we're not out to change the fact of who you are. We only want to change 
that small bit of you grossly unhappy with that fact' (5-6). Tricked into saying 'yes', the new Rat 
Korga is tran sf armed into a subjugated cyborg. Accordingly, a decade of hard labour, 
beatings, near death experiences, and sexual abuse passes until a desperate and miserable 
woman illegally purchases Rat as a sex slave, a fantasy lover, and as a person to read poetry 
to her. She explains to Rat how he has lost the ability to process information, how he needs a 
'supplement', to allow him to think again, and to fulfill his role for her. So she gives Rat a glove 
which, neurally connected, feeds him information and encourages the construction of 
'associations between external and internal perceptions', or 'knowledge, insight, belief, 
understanding, belligerence, pig-headedness, stupidity'. 'Only social use', elaborates the glove 
in Rat's mind, clearly espousing a politics of radical relativism, 'determines which associations 
are knowledge and which are not' (32-33). While Rat and the woman drive across thousands 
of kilometres of glittering desert under a scorching orange sky, Rat consumes at the rate of 
half a second each huge tomes of alien literatures which are lovingly, expansively and 
intricately described in the text. Their effect is tran sf ormative once again; Rat's view of the 
world resonates with new connections. Unfortunately though, the outlaw couple are soon 
captured by the police and Rat returns to his life in a labour camp ending this first part of the 
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novel which is ironically entitled 'A World Apart', Rat's status is suddenly changed once again: 
in a bizarre and mysterious firestorm, the surface of the planet is destroyed leaving Rat as the 
sole survivor. 
Soon after, Rat is discovered by rescuers who are keen to remap and replace his 
missing parts In a scene strongly reminiscent of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, the monster Rat 
Korga awakens in his tub of life-support fluid. The scene is heightened by the resonant use of 
birthing imagery. A solution is found to compensate for the jamming effects of Rat's brain 
mutilation which further complicates his radically cyborged identity. The text introduces 
Vondramach Okk, a 'hopelessly privileged' psychopathic ruler who had a penchant for self-
mutilation and subsequent limb replacement; we are told that at any one time she would 
normally have a wardrobe of prostheses made up for her and, for good reason; as a result of 
this pastime 'she'd had to replace most of her vascular, muscular, and skeletal systems, as 
well as a good deal of neural matter, several times over' (167). For Vondramach Okk, the 
synaptic jamming was simply an extension from the physical to the mental of her 'radically 
violent art-form'(163) of self creation. However, soon bored with the brain mutilation she had 
made hundreds of rings which would act as counterfeit neurological compensators. 
Finally Rat is reawakened complete with all prostheses. Steadily he rises from the 
vats: a 'tall naked male save a handful of rings' in sharp contrast to the experts 'cluttered with 
[their] accoutrements: silver suits, bright insignia, recorders, calculators, reading machines' 
etc (173). Clearly here, the text self-consciously invokes images of colonisation, of birthing 
and of creation; the alien and the spaceman, the monster and Frankenstein, God and Adam; 
in short, of the Subject who creates the Other, through their more powerful technologies. For 
this reason, Rat seems both pre-lapsarian and frighteningly alien: he is still a kind of monster 
but a cyborg monster. The final technology of self-making which Rat undergoes is to be linked 
to Marq as each other's perfect erotic object 
This concept of 'the perfect erotic object' sits very strangely within the novel. In spite 
of all this perfection, when they do meet, Marq's descriptions are very fragmented; Rat 
becomes an assemblage of attractive body parts which cannot be re-membered into a whole. 
This dynamic quality is an intrinsic part of desire. As Marq explains, 'the perfect erotic object 
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remains only in recognition memory; and his absolute absence from reconstruction memory 
becomes the yearning that is, finally, desire' (198). For once, Rat cannot be reconstructed into 
a whole in Marq's mind. So desire is disruptive rather than consolidating. It involves an active 
and constant creation of the other which also entails an endless deferral of resolution. Desire 
never achieves stasis. Just as Rat is a figure in process, Marq's desire for Rat is always in 
process. 
While the perfect erotic object is about endless creation, chasing the dissemination of 
differance, Marq believes in the stability of home. Symbolically, however, the destruction of 
this stability is most strongly represented by a friend visiting Marq's large and lavish 
apartment, complete with baroque furniture and massive views. To demonstrate that artifice 
guarantees the putative stability of this location, his friend George switches off the technology 
which generates Marq's room and, in surrealist coup de theatre: 
Stars and clouds went out. 
The hills, with Morgre between, vanished. George laughed. Fire cactus faded. Some 
where the stream ceased to plash. Bed and desk and rail and carpet disappeared. 
Three metres by three metres, my living room's wall plates had once been sprayed ... 
with a translucent green gum that had now worn off the centre of the floor showing 
tarnished blotches. Where the metal bolt-heads were deeply inset, some of the coating 
had pulled loose, though still after a century it still accomplished its major job: to keep 
any random chemical reactions in the walls' surface from adding any upsetting order to 
the image the plates could be excited to project. 
George, no longer bronze and not quite so tall, stood by the control post that slanted 
up, off center, in the pentagonal floor. "Same technology. Same everything ... Not a bit 
different from mine. 
(139-140) 
George disrupts not only the illusion of solidity of Marq's location and representations, 
revealing a framework of technologies underneath which have prevented 'any upsetting order' 
disturbing the projected images. George's aim is to narrow the differences separating Marq 
from himself. His comments about everything being the same beneath the surface provoke 
Marq to rethink what home is: 'I know how much of my world-its streets, its hills, its runs, its 
rains, the halls, the heat, the sky, the stars, the stream itself-is and is not an illusion. But for 
a moment, as I sat at my desk, still lost in the disruption from George's invasion, I felt as 
foreign a creature from one of those primitive geosectors on some world where all productive 
media are safely contained in clearly visible frames, who for the first time, confronts a modern 
society where all is what we once called ... spectacle. (342) All of a sudden Marq feels as 
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though there is no stability nor certainty. While George only disrupts the surface of 
representation, this is revealing of their lack of authenticity. Home becomes just another 
illusion; a spectacle. 
The effect of reimaging the world as illusion and spectacle, of losing Rat and the 
stability of home, is narrated by Marq as if he too had undergone synapse-jamming. His 
technologies of self, are either illusory, unstable or arbitrary. In the third part of the novel, he is 
no longer a confident cultural translator. Old certainties have dissolved and in their place is a 
profound sense of loss. Marq marvels at his ability to be able to converse with anyone at all. 
Of an alien woman he muses 'that they both could find something in common to talk about ... 
was ... where all wonder lay' (check p360). The concept of a woman, of space travel, of dawn: 
none of these concepts is simple, their cultural conceptual referants are easily dislodged and 
made utterly alien. And taking away Rat, says Marq, has 'practically destroyed my 
home'(371). Yet it seems that Marq is mistaken here: being with Rat practically destroyed his 
home for it entailed, as he says, 'seeing identity at its most intense' and 'to see that identity 
shatter, fragment, and to realise that its solidity was always an illusion, and that infinite spaces 
between those referential shards are more opaque to direct human apprehension than all of 
the star-studded vacuum' (364 my italics). And in a marvelous diatribe of loss Marq describes 
the 'edgeless dislocation that marked the nothingness between .. . half sleep and a loggy 
waking'. 
Hence, Rat is a destabilising force. He knows no home nor stability, no perspective 
even a partial one. In the course of his many radical reinventions, he constantly unsettles all 
social and cultural structures which come into contact with him. Disruption is the only constant 
in his identity. Finally, Rat seems to precipitate a phenomenon which the text refers to as 
'Cultural Fugue'. This Fugue is represented in the dreamy and chaotic epilogue. Marq is 
aboard a huge interstellar colony ship strung up on a hammock beside thousands of other 
sleeping bodies: an image of cultural diaspora from the 'marking' of the 'death' of the coherent, 
self-aware subject within a knowable, translatable universe. The potent trope of sleeping 
bodies dangling in hammocks, is symbolic of the diaspora of the self and the loss of location. I 
will return to this point shortly. 
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As this precis shows, Rat's tran sf ormations are variously described as mutilations, 
mutations, rebirths, regenerations, remappings, as a radically violent art form, and as 
deformations. These changes signify quite different perceptions of the body. For instance, 
augmentation implies the body is a potential, rebirth imbues the body with Edenic narratives of 
origin and purity, remapping implies reading the body as text, mutilation invokes the body as a 
site of battlegrounds, whereas as an artform in progress, the body is a playground. As Marq's 
Perfect Erotic Object, Rat becomes 'an assemblage of parts that cannot be reordered,' and as 
a perfect mirror image of Marq's desire. All of these ideas narrate differing possibilities and 
ideologies relating to bodily technological change. 
Whereas in Neuromancer the emphasis was strongly on individual enhancement, 
Stars contains bodily change without consent. In Neuromancer, bodily change is consensual 
but as it enacts a code of survival, most people need to be enhanced to survive. 
Enhancement, for both cosmetic and functional reasons, is common, and this reflects different 
social spaces. While Gibson sets this clearly within a continuum of most real and original 
(Rastafarians, ethnic youth) to most representational and perverse (the vampire cloned 
Tessier-Ashpool, the trapped identity of Dixie Flatline), Delany constructs no such 
comparisons. He is too interested in multiple, polymorphous forms of figuration to foreclose on 
any. Also the notion of a continuum symbolically reenacts the deadly logocentric assumption 
that difference can only be construed in hierarchical terms. However, the problems with lack 
of any foreclosure, Delany makes quite evident in the poststructuralist narrative disintegration. 
Espen Aarseth approaches the issue of cyborg figuration from a slightly different 
angle: 'Any cyborg field, as any communication field, is dominated by the issue of domination 
or control. The key question in cyborg aesthetics is therefore, Who or what controls the text? 
Ideologically, there are three positions of struggle: author control, text control, and reader 
control'108 In Delany's novel, the control of the narrative is initially Marq's responsibility. As his 
control becomes increasingly impossible through Rat's multiple disruptive reconstructions, the 
control becomes textual in Aaseth's terms. As Aarseth comments on textual control: 'the text 
is an impurity, a site of struggle between medium, sign and operator' 109 This sense of struggle 
to master the narrative is incorporated in Marq's desire to 'reconstruct' Rat in his mind, which, 
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finally, he finds impossible. His failure to do this is not without effort. Marq's language testifies 
to the attempt to overdetermine the narrative-in precisely the way of Barthes' readerly 
(lisible) text. However, by this very overdetermination, the reality effect is put in jeopardy; 
'awash in a flood of information about how meaning is constructed' 110, as Mark Jenkins 
describes the novel's language. 
If Rat can be read, then, as symbolic of a deeply post-structuralist identity, this 
figuration, and the aesthetic it embodies in its multiple changes, is ultimately depressing in the 
loss of all stability and location. While Rat dispels metanarratives, defies hierarchies and 
recreates his stories of origins, he is also denied the possibility of any points of certainty, 
belief or sustained commitment. By virtue of being remapped so easily, he has no stubbornly 
residual personality, or maps, of his own. The disillusionment of this cyborg figure is in stark 
relief to Haraway's utopian vision of the cyborg in the 'Manifesto'. This is in spite of her cyborg 
being described as 'a kind of disassembled, reassembled, post-modern collective and 
personal self' 111 
Also published in the same year as these texts, Donna Haraway's 'A Manifesto for 
Cyborgs' contains a very different kind of cyborg metaphor. Haraway emphasises the 
embodiment of the cyborg to stress a sense of stability located in the bodily which is 
responsible in its recursive technological constructions. This cyborg does not easily fly away 
along the nodes of the network, or into the exhaltation of cyberspace. The visceral and 
symbolic body prevent it from doing so. The cyborg's partial perspective and objective vision 
Haraway celebrates is, hence, a practice of recognising boundaries, transgressing them, and 
tran sf arming notions of otherness. This is from an embodied position and with a recognition 
of a finite and polluted point of view. 112 The cyborged body is, in this way, both the real place 
of utterance and perspective and an emblematic, tropic place. The body works well tropically 
because, just as it cannot be erased; it can hurt, it is finite. 
In terms of this politics of embodiment, this is what makes Haraway's cyborg a 
creature which stands for radical contingency, rather than the radically relativism of a cyborg 
like Rat. Contingency means that, things hinge on other things which are historical, important 
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and able to be gauged rather than things hinge on other things which are historical important 
but unable to be gauged. 
In his reading of Haraway's manifesto, Delany explicitly narrates his struggle against 
the violence inherent in the creation of a master discourse within a text, or a reading of a text, 
and the urge toward open-endedness. These struggles are also the struggles of a cyborgian 
consciousness, of politics, and of literary criticism. His reading of Haraway could also be seen 
as a more self-reflexive theoretical version of Stars. He sees what he calls 'the gap' in 
Haraway's work between dualistic notions of construction. Delany compares: 'Liberation rests 
on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and 
so of possibility,' from the Manifesto, with '[this is] an argument for pleasure in the confusion of 
boundaries and for responsibility in their construction.' Construction, according to Delany 
means both: 'to build or to create from former materials' and also 'to construe, to understand, 
to analyze, to tear down into its constituent parts' 113 Construction, of metaphors through 
prostheses, of arguments through various writing technologies, of cyborgs, must negotiate the 
urges between destruction and construction, to paraphrase Delany. He clarifies: 'For my 
argument ... to be useful ....... It must be analyzed, fragmented, sliced open, cut up, cut off, 
fragments of it recombined ... till all unity is struck from it (the very concept of unity returns 
only to trouble, to critique, to annoy), resembling rather some junk-lot of deformed monsters, 
part human part machine, and then-perhaps-some part of it cut off or up or out for new use, 
while the rest is simply left missing.' 114 Amongst all of this linguistic violence, the figure of Rat 
becomes clearer, and with him also a very Foucaultian sense of the violation power and 
mastery have over the human 'docile' body, and which discourse enacts. Fusions are not with 
utopian possibilities, in the way of Haraway's attempted feminist myth-making, as they must 
necessarily involve tearing other things apart. 
If then, Stars can be read as Delany's allegory of knowledge making, then Marq is the 
mark, of power of civilisation, of power, he is the power to tell the stories, to construct wholes, 
albeit situated ones. Marq's narrative evolution is clear: in stark contrast to the novel's final 
and depressingly dislocated narratives, Marq's original narratives are brim-full of authenticity-
generating devices; geographical, temporal, cultural and semantic technologies which help 
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create the sense of verisimilitude within the disjunctive reality of the science fiction world. 
However, as a counterweight to this attempt to (over)determine the meaningfulness of the 
narrative is the text's implicit deconstruction of such coherent frameworks and by the 
disruption of identity effected by Rat. Rat, in this schema, is the body always in a dynamic of 
construction and destruction, fought over, unshared, and violated of its integrity. Rat is in a 
dynamic of various technologies of power, which, as Foucault, elaborated 'determine the 
conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends of domination, and objectif[y] the 
subject'. 115 The novel, then, in its movement, of order to disorder, enacts the atrophying of the 
ability to order and to narrate within the nexus of dominating power relations. Order to disorder 
also reverses the usual move of the previous sf texts. 
The notion of self-making is also inextricably tied to knowledge-making in 
Neuromancer's beleagured post-apocalptic world. However, Gibson does make way for some 
more essential, undisrupted figures and their 'truths'. While Mark Jenkins maintains that 
'Gibson pursues mutating relations of subjects and objects across a terrain characterized by 
frequent disruption of narratives and of hierarchy, resisting the modernist legacy of purity and 
identity',116 the notion of a continuum itself reinstates a definite hierarchy, even if it is more 
complex and useful than oppositional categories. 
Finally, if these novels present in their differing ways a response to the urge 
to recapture the fragmented, stressed, technologically-implicated figure of Man, then their 
responses are also fraught with dangers. What is interesting, though, is their problematisation 
of the figure of the cyborg. The cyborg cannot be a unitary figure, espousing a unitary politics. 
The feminist film critic Teresa de Lauretis has pointed out that bodies are made by ideologies 
which 'will never exhaust or fully coincide with [these ideologies]'. 117 If we replace 'ideologies' 
with 'technologies' then we have an interesting paradigm for cyborgs insofar as the technology 
of the cyborg will never exhaust or fully coincide with the natural body either. This makes it a 
multiple figure; articulated into the technologies of the city as much as it articulates its own 
bodily enhancements. The desire to leave this body as a symbolic site of location in favour of 
radical reconstruction is not held as promising, according to Delany. It enacts, rather, a state 
of perpetual denial of limits and location. Or, additionally, according to Gibson, the desire to 
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leave the material body is a desire for self-annihilation, as Gibson shows in the aesthetic of 
simstim and cyberspace. 
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Some Conclusions 
The critical practice I have adopted here-of reading narratives, tropes and ironies 
which are a contested part of the fraught technocultural map-is, above all, a practice which 
aims to denaturalise sedimented ideologies. The ideologies which resist this denaturalistion 
and concomitant politicisation are, paradoxially, often the ones which disguise the most their 
implicit dominations. Hence, they are often the ones that seem the most natural. The 
historically-derived narratives of progress, of the techolgoical sublime, and of a colonial 
relationship between man and nature, for instance, are implicit in upholding the ascendency of 
science as a truth discourse which is outside of the cultural practices which gives rise to it in 
the first place. Hence, science relies on this philophical tautology to uphold its Truth telling. 
Additonally, this truth telling is based in an epistemological belief in the symbolic transparency 
of representation to reality. By proposing a narrative reading of science, technology and 
techocultural figures, the nuanced and mediated relation of practice to truth is emphasised. 
Just as the US Department of Energy aims to provide an 'account' of their work in 'To Know 
Ourselves', after the feminist practice of situating knowledges, these accounts should also be 
accountable to their placement in relations of politics and power. 
Contesting the economy of technocultural narratives is also about creating new tropes 
and figurations for life. Sf texts are full of such rich tropes. By their conjoining of fiction with 
science, sf texts are located across the boundaries of these anxieties and the historical 
framework which distill out the political from the technical. Hence, sf can offer a rich resource 
for gauging social and cultural crisis points. Even when these texts are implicitly conservative 
in their recuperation of logocentric ideologies, such as those which guarantee the dominant 
place of Man, this process is made more readily evident. 
An important focus of many of these texts is the future of the body. While Donna 
Haraway has suggested the political and utopian figure of the cyborg as a trope for life 'in the 
integrated circuit", sf representations of human-machine fusions are far from utopian. Through 
the technolgies of the city, or of other spaces such as cyberspace, prosthetic enhancements 
or genetic alterations, technologies often challenge both the coherency of the visceral and 
symbolic body in a way which ultimately reinforces existing social oppressions. 
In addition, the possibilities for radically different kinds of cyborgs also narrrate very 
different relationships, such as are inscribed in the concepts of the body, the human, and the 
notion of the humanist individual. As the cyborg is always engaged in this process of radically 
disrupting received notions of otherness, it is a boundary-crossing figure which challenges the 
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stability of logocentric Man and his extant ideologies. But just as Man is not just one figure, 
nor do cyborgs trangress boundaries in the same ways. The relationship of narrative to the 
body is illustrated in Samuel Delany's Stars in my Pocket Like Grains of Sand where the 
radically reinvented cyborg figure is shown to provide such a strongly disruptive potential to 
notions such as location. This disruptive potential may be composed to a radical relativism 
whereas a politics of locating knowledge requires embodiment, albeit a knowingly constructed 
one. Finally, this account suggests that origins and truth-telling are necessary components of 
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